This concept has been used in the past, in places such as the Weimar Republic (in 1923), the Soviet Union (when it broke up in the early 1990s), and more recently, in some emerging market regions.
But for Finland the concept is different. If a country such as Greece was to adopt its own currency alongside the euro, it would act from a position of weakness and probably need to force its citizens to hold drachma.
However, says Nordea: “Finland’s exit of its own accord would differ from a Greek exit, because a balanced national economy may, theoretically speaking, have two currencies even for a long transition period, and peg the new markka to the euro at a rate of 1:1 during the transition period.”
Most notably, under that scenario – of strength – the Finnish central bank could effectively let consumers and customers choose which currency they preferred to use. “Euros will not automatically be converted into markka; all deposits, debt and agreements will remain in euros until the depositors transfer their deposits to markka-denominated accounts and the parties to the agreements amend their contracts,” Nordea writes.
It adds that, “during the transition period, the Bank of Finland will offer to exchange euros and markkas at a rate of 1:1 both ways”. Only later would the markka float against the euro; and the latter could theoretically remain legal tender.
Whether Finns would “choose” to convert their euros, in this theoretical scenario, would depend on where they think that markka is heading. Right now, most investors would expect it to jump. After all, during the past year Finland has been viewed as a haven. If that continued, it might “lead to a mass movement of investors, which will strengthen the currency more than warranted by the situation of the real economy”.
But it is possible to imagine an alternative scenario. Prior to the past decade, Finland experienced periods of financial instability, and the tiny size of any new markka-denominated market might also prompt capital flight.
“A significant proportion of the money invested in Finland during the euro era comes from investors who have been looking for safe euro-denominated investments and are not willing to carry the exchange rate risk associated with a small fringe currency,” Nordea notes. “If foreign investors leave ... the liquidity of Finnish markka-denominated listed equity and bond markets will decrease, risk premiums will increase and high fluctuations in prices will become more frequent.”
And nobody could count on the European Central Bank to smooth over any wild volatility; after all, one of the central problems with any parallel currency regime is that it is unclear who (if anybody) is supposed to be in charge, or will take responsibility for losses. Little surprise, then, that parallel currencies have rarely worked well for long, or not without draconian capital controls.
Now, as noted above, discussions such as this by Nordea are still hypothetical. After all, as one of Finland’s leading investors recently told New York financiers: “The business community and politicians are very scared of leaving the euro ... we are unlikely to do it.”
But it is worth remembering that most Finns abhor those ECB bailouts; having embraced creative destruction in their own history, they now loathe moral hazard with a puritan zeal. And the longer the eurozone crisis rumbles on, the easier it becomes to imagine the once-unimaginable.
Perhaps it is time for ECB president Mario Draghi to visit Helsinki; if nothing else, Nordea’s report is a timely reminder that it is not just Greece and Spain that now have the capacity to surprise.