Exploring mainly Heterodox type Economics, Monetary Reform, Environmental Sustainability, and Climate Change. It is a resource of Internet articles, and also promotes awareness of a futuristic modern universal Paradigm known as TFE, or Transfinancial Economics which is probably the most advanced, and most "scientific" form of Economics in the world .
This entry is about the forthcoming book "Network Society and Future Scenarios for a Collaborative Economy" co-authored by Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens. The scholarly book will be published by Palgrave Macmillan in September 2014 and here you may find a working draft of it.
Preface
The aim of this book is not to provide another critique of capitalism; rather to contribute to the ongoing dialogue for post-capitalist construction and discuss how another world could be possible. We build on the idea that the peer-to-peer infrastructures are gradually becoming the general conditions of work, economy and society, considering peer production as a social advancement within capitalism but with various post-capitalistic aspects in need of protection, enforcement, stimulation and connection with progressive social movements. Using a four-scenario approach we attempt to simplify possible outcomes and explore relevant trajectories of the current techno-economic paradigm within and beyond capitalism. The first part of the book begins with an introduction (chapters 1 and 2) of the techno-economic paradigm shifts theory which sees capitalism as a creative destruction process. Such a dynamic, innovation-based understanding of economic and societal development arguably allows for an integral bird's-eye-view of future scenarios (chapter 3) within and beyond the dominant system. Sharing the conviction that the globalized economy is at a critical turning point, we describe the four future scenarios; namely, netarchical capitalism, distributed capitalism, resilient communities and global Commons. Netarchical and distributed capitalism (chapters 4 and 5) are parts of the wider value mode of cognitive capitalism and form, what we call, the mixed model of neo-feudal cognitive capitalism (chapter 6). On the other, the resilient communities (chapter 7) and the global Commons (chapter 8) reside in the hypothetical model of mature peer production under civic dominance. We postulate that the mature peer production communities pose a sustainable alternative to the capital accumulation, that of the circulation of the Commons. Hence, we make tentative transition proposals for the state, the market and the civic domain towards a Commons-based economy and society (chapter 9). Finally, we conclude with remarks and suggestions for future action.
Humans have been using gold as a store of value for millennia. The earliest pure gold coins date to about 560 B.C. in what is now Turkey. Gold coins proliferated for many reasons: The metal is shiny, durable, malleable, easy to test for authenticity, and non-reactive.
We can count on it to not dissolve, mildew, or catch fire. Gold was, and still is, pretty scarce. In all of history, the total amount of gold ever mined totals about 165,000 tons, a weight equal to that of one and a half US aircraft carriers. Coins made from silver (the word “coin” means “invent”) have many of the same attributes as their gold cousins and have been in use for centuries.
While silver and gold have many positive characteristics, they also have a key drawback: They’re heavy.
In the 13th century, the Chinese emperor Kublai Khan changed the way we think about money. Khan’s great insight was that money—in the form of sea shells or gold coins—was valuable only if people believed in it. He also knew that the different regions of China were issuing their own coins, which made trade within his empire more difficult.
So Khan created a new currency based on paper money. By decreeing that his paper money had value, his subjects believed that it did. Khan’s paper money not only provided a common currency for his empire, it was also far superior to gold and silver coins for an obvious reason: It was lighter. Being lighter, Khan’s paper money made trade faster.
Consider, for example, the farmer rich in chickens or apples. He could, of course, transport his birds and fruit to town and barter them for something he really needs, like horseshoes or butter. But if the farmer can instead sell his products, collect some currency, and then use it to pay the farrier or the dairyman, the entire process happens faster, with less friction for both parties.
Africa: Where the New Money Is
In 2012, James Surowiecki, an author and staff writer for the New Yorker, wrote that successful currencies “lubricate commerce, allow people to exchange goods and services, and thus encourage people to work and create.” He then quoted the German sociologist Georg Simmel, who has described money as “pure interaction.” Surowiecki continued, writing that “when money is working as it should, it is not so much a thing as it is a process.”
That’s an essential point: Money isn’t a thing, it’s a process. It’s only worthwhile because it allows us to engage in “pure interaction.”
We want to sell, buy, haggle, argue, travel. We want to do more, of everything. We don’t give a darn about the form of our money; we only care that it allows us to buy and to do, whether that means buying a bale of toilet paper at Costco or securing passage to Panama City. Having an easy method of exchanging value greases the wheels of commerce and the slicker the lubricant, the better.
Today, the slickest currency exists as digits that reside on the SIM cards inside mobile phones. To be sure, digital money is not entirely new. For decades, financial institutions, corporations, and individuals have relied on wire transfers to exchange money.
In 2012, according to the Fedwire Funds Service, the wire-payments network operated by the US Federal Reserve, nearly $2.4 trillion per day was moved by wire transfer. For banks and big companies, digital money has long been a fact of life.
That hasn’t been the case for consumers, though. Sure, lots of people forgo cash by carrying credit cards and debit cards, which are a form of electronic payment. But those methods are not truly digital.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the move toward digital money and mobile payments is that the trend shows its strongest growth in Africa, a continent that has often struggled to keep up with the world in other areas of development.
Phones are giving millions of Africans access to a trustworthy, secure money ecosystem.
In countries like Kenya and South Africa, pure interactions are happening with currency that weighs nothing at all. Currency is being exchanged on the simplest cell phones using the simplest technology: text messaging, or SMS, for short message service.
SMS is the perfect communication system for Africa, where the majority of consumers can’t afford high-dollar devices like the iPhone or an Android-powered device. They use older Nokia phones or the decade-old Samsung E250, a phone that has been dubbed the AK-47 of African telecom because it is cheap and nearly indestructible.
Most people living in sub-Saharan Africa are “unbanked,” meaning they don’t have bank accounts or credit cards. But nearly all of them have a phone. And those phones are giving millions of Africans access to a trustworthy, secure money ecosystem.
Just as Africa leapfrogged the idea of landline telephones and went straight to digital mobile phones, so, too, is Africa vaulting over the idea of currencies and going straight to digital money.
By 2013, about 80 percent of the world’s mobile payment transactions were happening in East Africa.
The biggest player in East Africa is M-PESA, which was launched in March 2007 by Safaricom, a Kenyan mobile phone provider that is 40 percent owned by mobile giant Vodafone. Within 16 months, M-PESA—the “m” stands for mobile, while “pesa” is the Swahili word for money—had 3.6 million customers, and the system was adding 10,000 new registrations every day.
By July 2008, the system was handling 21 billion Kenyan shillings ($245 million) of transactions per month, with an average value of 2,800 Kenyan shillings, (about $33) each.
The system is simple: Customers who have cash in their pockets can go to any of M-PESA’s agents and have that paper money converted into mobile money. They can also reverse that process.
M-PESA has grown rapidly thanks to Safaricom’s dominance of the Kenyan mobile phone sector. By 2013, Safaricom had nearly as many subscribers, about 19 million, as Kenya has adults. And of those 19 million phone subscribers, about 15 million were using M-PESA. (Kenya’s population is about 43 million.)
Those 15 million have been using M-PESA to pay for everything from utilities and insurance to school fees and health care. They can also transfer money directly to another person. The system is easy to use: When an M-PESA user wants to buy something from a vendor, he uses his phone to transfer the required amount via text message.
The Unexpected Side Effects of Digital Currency
Although digital money can be used by criminals, it can also be used to fight corruption.
In 2012, Jessica Leber wrote an article for MIT Technology Review in which she told about a group of Afghan policemen in Wardak province who began getting their wages paid through their cell phones in 2009. The payments came through M-Paisa, a mobile payment system run by Afghanistan’s biggest telecom company, Roshan, which was modeled on Kenya’s M-PESA.
For the first time, the Afghan officers’ wages weren’t paid in cash, and therefore, weren’t subject to skimming by their superiors, who had been stealing about 30 percent of the money.
Immediately after the first pay period in which they got paid through their phones, the policemen assumed they’d gotten a raise. The reality was that for the first time, their wages weren’t paid in cash, and therefore, weren’t subject to skimming by their superior officers, who had been stealing about 30 percent of the money.
Leber pointed out that about half of the 700,000 government employees in Afghanistan don’t have bank accounts. And getting cash to those employees is fraught with danger because of the country’s security problems.
Paying them with digital cash on their phones is cheaper because it doesn’t require the government to print currency. In addition, digital money obviates the need for armored trucks and armed personnel, both of which are needed when large sums of currency are transported. Using mobile payments could also help alleviate both security and corruption issues. The scale of the latter problem is both staggering and depressing. In 2012, Afghans paid nearly $4 billion in bribes, an amount that’s roughly double the country’s domestic tax revenue.
Mobile payments are not going to cure the world’s corruption problems or bring all of the people who are living in poverty into prosperity. And it remains to be seen what will happen with other forms of digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that launched a flurry of financial speculation in 2013 when investors started buying Bitcoins — and driving up their price — with the hope that they will gain in value in the years ahead.
But M-PESA and other mobile payment schemes show us what can happen if people who don’t have access to paper money or formal banking systems are allowed to engage in commerce with digital currency. Having a reliable, trustable method of exchanging value—even if it’s just digits on your phone—builds communities and economies. It allows people to save the fruit of their labor. And it fosters the diffusion and accumulation of wealth. Excerpted from the bookSmaller Faster Lighter Denser Cheaper: How Innovation Keeps Proving the Catastrophists Wrong by Robert Bryce. Excerpt by arrangement with PublicAffairs, a member of the Perseus Books Group. Copyright 2014.
It’s time to shine a light on the deals and the money
Secrecy in the oil, gas and mining sector allows the corrupt to steal billions.
Nigeria has been in the midst of an oil boom for over 50 years, yet 84% of Nigerians live on less than $2 a day. An estimated $400bn has gone missing from oil revenues in the country. This was possible because the secrecy in which the oil, gas and mining deals are conducted allows corruption to flourish.
If citizens, journalists and MPs don’t know the details of natural resource deals and payments, they can’t hold their governments to account.
Global Witness has been campaigning for transparency for 20 years. Our campaigning has led to the establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative which requires companies in countries like Nigeria to declare what they pay to governments and governments to declare what they receive to allow citizens to follow the money.
We've also campaigned for ground-breaking new transparency laws in the US and the EU which mean that most of the world's biggest oil and mining firms are now required to declare what they pay to governments.
In the face of a big backlash from big oil and gas companies who want to continue to operate in secret, we’re continuing our campaigns for transparency.
Read more about our campaigns below.
Many of the resource-rich countries that Global Witness works in have been looted by the very politicians who have been entrusted with developing those economies.
According to conservative estimates more than $450 billion illicitly left African countries during the last decade. Money flows of this kind of scale could not happen without the willingness of banks and other professionals (like estate agents and lawyers) to facilitate the movement of the money, often with the help of anonymous companies to disguise the purpose of transactions.
Banks stand to make big profits from accepting the business of rich, dodgy customers, whether that be tax evaders, corrupt politicians looting money from the budgets of poor countries or other criminals. And yet despite the existence of fairly stringent-sounding anti-money laundering laws, the risks they face for taking tainted assets are small. Banks are rarely caught and when they are, the punishment is small: the fines may seem large to members of the public, but are often only a fraction of the bank’s profits; and there is very limited personal responsibility from individual bankers.
We’re campaigning for a more effective system of deterrents. Senior people within banks need to be held individually responsible for the actions of their institutions; sanctions need to be sufficiently dissuasive; and regulators must improve the way they enforce the existing rules which make it illegal to accept dirty money.
Progress in the UK:
In December 2013, the UK committed to new measures which could herald a sea change in the way banks uphold the anti-money laundering laws. As part of the Banking Reform Bill passed by parliament, a named senior executive at each bank will be held personally responsible for their bank’s performance in this area, something that Global Witness has been campaigning for.
Read more:
Poverty, corruption and anonymous companies, a briefing document that outlines how banks, as well as anonymous companies, play a role in fuelling corruption, March 2014
Undue Diligence: how banks do business with corrupt regimesAn investigation by Global Witness into how a number of the world’s largest banks, including HSBC, Citibank, and Barclays, have done business with some of the world’s most corrupt regimes, including Equatorial Guinea, Turkmenistan and Charles Taylor’s Liberia, March 2009
Further detail:
HSBC failed to establish and maintain adequate anti-money laundering systems and so allowed money laundering by drugs cartels, terrorists and pariah states into the US. Read Global Witness’ comment on this here, here, here, here
We teamed up with Bill Oddie to protest against HSBC’s business ties to companies that are illegally destroying rainforests and abusing human rights in Sarawak. See the video and read the associated report.
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to reduce poverty by making welfare programs conditional upon the receivers' actions. The government (or a charity) only transfers the money to persons who meet certain criteria. These criteria may include enrolling children into public schools, getting regular check-ups at the doctor's office, receiving vaccinations, or the like. CCTs are unique in seeking to help the current generation in poverty, as well as breaking the cycle of poverty for the next through the development of human capital.
Conditional cash transfers exist in the following countries, among many others:
Brazil: Bolsa FamÃlia (formerly Bolsa Escola) started in the 1990s and expanded rapidly in 2001 and 2002. It provides monthly cash payments to poor households if their school-aged children (between the ages of 6 and 15) are enrolled in school, and if their younger children (under age 6) have received vaccinations.[1][2]
Chile: Chile Solidario, established in 2002,[3] requires the family to sign a contract to meet 53 specified minimum conditions seen as necessary to overcome extreme poverty. In exchange, they receive from the state psychosocial support, protection bonds, guaranteed cash subsidies, and preferential access to skill development, work and social security programmes.[4]
Colombia: Familias en Acción,[3] established in 2002, is a conditional cash transfer programme, very similar to the Mexican PROGRESA/Oportunidades, consisting of cash transfers to poor families conditional on children attending school and meeting basic preventive health care requirements.[5]
Honduras: The Family Allowance Program (PRAF II) created in 1998 was based on the PRAF I program created in 1990.[6] The Family Allowance Program, PRAF, founded in 1990 as a social compensation program of the government of the Republic of Honduras.[7][8]
Jamaica: Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH), administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security,[3] is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme. It provides cash transfers to poor families, who are subject to comply with conditions that promote the development of the human capital of their members. PATH was created in 2001, as part of a wide-ranging reform of the welfare system carried out by the government of Jamaica.[9]
Indonesia: Program Keluarga Harapan and Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat-Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas, both established in 2007. The Program Keluarga Harapan is a household CCT program, while Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat is a community-based CCT program. They are focused on reducing poverty, maternal mortality, and child mortality and providing universal coverage of basic education.[10]
Mexico: Oportunidades is the principal anti-poverty program of the Mexican government. (The original name of the program was Progresa; it was changed in 2002.) Oportunidades focuses on helping poor families in rural and urban communities invest in human capital—improving the education, health, and nutrition of their children.[11][12][13]
Guatemala: Mi Familia Progresa, established April 16, 2008, is a conditional cash transfer program that is intended to provide financial support to families living in poverty and extreme poverty and who have children age 0 to 15 years and/or pregnant women or nursing mothers who live mainly in rural and marginal areas of the peripheries of urban centers (cities).[14]
Nicaragua: The Social Protection Network, established in 2000 and implemented by the Social Emergency Fund (FISE),[3] was terminated in 2005.[15]
Panama: Red de Oportunidades is a program implemented by the Government of Panama to the population under 18 to provide them access to health services and education.[16]
Philippines: Department of Social Welfare and Development — Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, is a social development strategy of the national government that provides conditional cash grants to extremely poor households to improve their health, nutrition and education particularly of children age 0-14.[17]
Peru: Juntos was established in 2005. The program provides a monthly dividend to mothers (married or single) living in extreme poverty. Mothers can only qualify for the program if they send their children to school and take them for regular medical checkups.[18]
Turkey: Şartlı Nakit Transferi, established in 2003 and implemented by the Social Assistance and Solidarity General Directorate (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü)
Egypt: Program Minhet El-Osra, began in 2009, currently being piloted in an urban slum in Cairo, Ain Es-Sira, and 65 villages in rural Upper Egypt by the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity
United States of America: Opportunity NYC. ONYC ended on August 31, 2010. The program built on the conceptual framework and success of international conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs and was the first major CCT initiative implemented in the United States. The principal objective of Opportunity NYC Family Rewards was to test the impact of monetary incentives on children’s education, family health and adults’ workforce outcomes.[19]
Bangladesh: Female Secondary School Assistance Project, established in 1994. This CCT program, conditional only on school attendance and girls remaining unmarried, provides tuition and stipends.[20]
Cambodia: Cambodia Education Sector Support Project, established in 2005, is conditional on attendance and maintaining passing grades.[21]
Few development initiatives have been evaluated as rigorously as CCT programs.[22] The implementation of conditional cash transfer programs has been accompanied by systematic efforts to measure their effectiveness and understand their broader impact on households’ behavior,[23] a marked departure from the limited attention that has been paid to rigorous impact evaluations in the past. Evaluation results are available for PROGRESA in Mexico,[24] PETI in Brazil and the Atencion a Crisis in Nicaragua.[25] These evaluations reveal that conditional cash transfers can provide effective incentives for investing in the poor’s human capital. CCTs have affected not only the overall level of consumption, but also the composition of consumption. There is a good deal of evidence that households that receive CCTs spend more on food and, within the food basket, on higher-quality sources of nutrients than do households that do not receive the transfer but have comparable overall income or consumption levels.[26] In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Turkey, where school enrollment rates among girls were lower than among boys, CCTs have helped reduce this gender gap.[27] CCTs have resulted in sizeable reductions in poverty among recipients—especially when the transfer has been sufficient, well targeted, and structured in a way that does not discourage recipients from taking other actions to escape poverty. Because CCTs provide a steady income, they have helped protect poor households from the worst effects of unemployment, catastrophic illness, and other sudden income shocks. And making cash transfers to women, as virtually all CCTs do, may have increased the bargaining power of women.[27]
In the US, a paper by the Institute for Research on Poverty concluded in 2011: "Over time, we find that expenditures have shifted toward the disabled and the elderly, and away from those with the lowest incomes and toward those with higher incomes, with the consequence that post-transfer rates of deep poverty for some groups have increased. We conclude that the U.S. benefit system is paternalistic and tilted toward the support of the employed and toward groups with special needs and perceived deservingness.".[28]
Many countries in Latin America are now using CCT programs as a major tool of their social policy since they have been proven to be very effective in helping poor families. Although the conditions and amounts of money may vary from country to country, ranging from $5 to $33 per child,[29] in general these programs provide money to poor families under the condition that those transfers are used as an investment on their children’s human capital, such as regular school attendance and basic preventive health care. The purpose of these programs is to address the inter-generational transmission of poverty and to foster social inclusion by targeting the poor, focusing on children, delivering transfers to women, and changing social accountability relationships between beneficiaries, service providers and governments.[30] Most of these transfer schemes are now benefiting around 110 million people in the region, and are considered relatively cheap, costing around 0.5% of their GDP.[31]
Conditional cash transfer programs can be very effective in reducing poverty in the short term since they have helped to increase household income and consumption in poor families.They have also worked effectively in increasing school enrollment and attendance, especially in middle school. A substantial improvement in health and nutrition of the children that benefit from these programs has been acknowledged.[32] However, studies by the UNDP have shown that conditional cash transfers neither represented a significant increase in the quality of education and in learning nor significant increased salaries, once the recipients entered the labor force.
Most CCT programs are very well-targeted and effective in reaching the poor and the excluded groups, notably the extreme poor living outside the reach of social protection programs tied with formal sector employment. On average, 80% of the benefits go to the 40% poorest families.[30] The programs have also promoted equality of gender since they provide larger funds to girls since they often drop out earlier, so it has increased their enrollment and attendance to secondary levels of education. In the long run, these investments may also yield to significant changes in women's empowerment and insertion in economic networks.[30]
While most conditional cash transfer programs are in Latin America, a significant amount of research has been conducted regarding the implementation of these programs in Africa. In addition, programs are looking to the Latin America for examples on how to implement these programs. While there are a few unconditional cash transfer programs in Africa being tested, two conditional cash transfer programs in Africa are currently[when?] being implemented. For CCTs to be successful, they require sufficient infrastructure. Poor education and health systems limit the benefits of CCT programs. Impacts should be seen in regard to the effectiveness of health and education institutions of the country.
Since 2007 a pilot conditional cash transfer program has been researching its effectiveness in Morocco, organized by the World Bank. The program targets poor regions of Morocco with high dropout rates and should cover 160,000 households by 2010.[33] The pilot program is a comparative test that has four treatment groups. One group is receiving unconditional cash transfers, regardless of child school attendance. The next three are given conditional cash transfers to families of children grades 3-6 based on the child's attendance at school.
The three treatment groups vary in how attendance is monitored, ranging from monitoring attendance based on teacher’s report, all the way to a sophisticated system involving monitoring through biometric fingerprint machines.[33]
In addition, within each classroom, which parent (the mother or father) is randomized to see if the family benefits more from having the money targeted to one or the other. This study will bring research that assesses the importance of conditionality, monitoring, and targeting within a conditional cash transfer program.[33]
Conditional cash transfer programs are not used widely in Europe. In the UK, in 2011 CentreForum proposed an additional child benefit dependent on parenting activities.[34]
Although the benefits of Conditional Cash Transfer programs across the world have been widely noted, there remains a series of obstacles to their success that have caused some programs to be stunted or terminated completely.[35]
According to a comprehensive study done by Senior Research Analysts Laura Rawlings and Gloria Rubio of the World Bank, the beginning stages of program implementation present the challenge of creating a reliable implementation schedule.[36] On many occasions, changes in political leadership, natural disasters, or changes in program administration have delayed the implementation schedule and lead to decreased efficiency or program termination.[36]
An example of the negative outcomes of one such delay is provided by the UN Development Programme's in-depth study of the short-lived Nicaragua's Social Protection Network. According to the study, the movement of the program administration to the country's Ministry of the Family caused a delay in efficiency and resources that, among other factors, led to the program's termination.[37] Delays can also be caused by difficulties in developing the Program Management Information System (MIS).[38]
One such delay in Mexico's Oportunidades program caused 27% of its targeted population not to receive any transfers after two years of implementation.[38]
In addition to unscheduled delays, other external factors that can hinder a CCT's success pertain to unexpected financial crisis.[39] According to a comprehensive assessment provided by the World Bank, the structure of Conditional Cash Transfer programs has not yet been adjusted to retain success in the event of a large financial crisis.[39]
Primarily, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs are not flexible enough to extend benefits to households that fall into the program's targeted population only during economic downturns. Thus, those not normally covered by the program's benefits may be harder hit than those who are but will not be able to be assisted.[39]
Another common obstacle to success in most CCTs is exclusion of needy homes in the targeting process. In an assessment by the World Bank, much exclusion was due to remote communities' inability to access schools or clinics. Many such communities fall into developing countries' most poverty-stricken populations but cannot follow through with conditionalities since the transportation costs to attend schools or hospital visits outweigh the benefits.[40] Furthermore, an evaluation of Mexico's PROGRESA- Oportunidades program addresses the issue that those in poverty with debilitating illnesses can also be excluded from CCTs due to their physical inability to accomplish the conditionalities.[41]
Exclusion has also been noted by both the World Bank study and the PROGRESA-Oportunidades evaluation evident in both community-based targeting and self-targeting approaches. In the case of self-targeting, used by Mexico's PROGRESA-Oportunidades, working women may be excluded from the program because they are unable to miss work to register or accomplish all conditions.[42] In the case of community-based targeting, the World Bank study notes that the extremely poor who may live in generally middle-class communities will be excluded.[43]
Targeted populations' distrust of the program due to lack of adequate information has been noted by at least three case studies to be a leading factor in the Conditional Cash Transfer programs’ downfalls. The extensive study by the UN Development Programme on Nicaragua's Social Protection Network (RPS) reveals that the level of distrust of the program was so high that a domestic publicity campaign could have possibly saved the RPS from extinction.[44] This high level of domestic distrust was due, in part, to efforts to politicize the program.[45]
One report addressed in the UN Development Programme's study stated that RPS employees were approached by members of the government, who demanded that half their salaries be donated to the party in power. Although the RPS was successful in avoiding the threats, it was later revealed that the RPS was the only Nicaraguan institution of its kind not making governmental contributions.[45]
This same level of distrust is reflected in a study on the feasibility of a Haitian CCT made by the International Food Policy Research Institute. In the focus group they interviewed, almost all subjects expressed a "profound lack of faith" in the Haitian government. Instead, they preferred that the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs be implemented by community committees or NGO’s.[46]
However, this distrust in governments' ability to fairly implement Conditional CCTs fairly is not strictly limited to developing countries. In an article in the New York Times addressing the termination of the pilot CCT, Opportunity NYC, the committee leader of one of its lending institutions stated that people were distrustful and confused by the program's intricacies. New York City's deputy mayor for health and human services added that many busy and stressed households were not being able to handle the wealth of conditions they had to complete since they were not efficiently educated about the program.[47]
Unconditional versus conditional cash transfers[edit]
There is currently much discussion about whether conditionality, or conditions for the cash transfer, is necessary or important to a cash transfer program. Research, such as the pilot conditional cash transfer program in Indonesia called Generasi, examined the importance of conditionality.[48] One report looks at data from Mexico's Oportunidades/Progresa program, which looks at families who accidentally did not receive forms that monitor school attendance and therefore received unconditional cash transfers. It then compares them with those households that did receive the forms. It was shown that conditionality had the strongest impact on children's attendance to secondary school, as enrollment rates in secondary school were higher for those that received the forms.[49]
Another report on an experiment in Malawi is researching the importance of conditionality among families with school-age girls. The program was conducted, with data collected between October 2007 and June 2010.[50] It was found that the treatment arm providing conditional cash transfer programs had higher enrollment rates, as well as higher scores in independently administered tests of cognitive ability, mathematics and English reading comprehension. However, the UCT treatment arm had a much lower incidence of pregnancy and marriage among schoolage girls.
A strong argument against the conditionality of social cash transfers is proposed by proponents of a rights-based approach to development. From a human rights perspective, cash transfers are a means to ensure the human rights to social protection and an adequate standard of living for all members of society, including first and foremost the fundamental right to food. States have the duty to ensure those rights with a maximum of available resources. While reducing poverty in general, conditional cash transfers have shown to often exclude those who need it the most, violating the human rights principle of non-discrimination and equality.[51]
The following program in Malawi is an example of an unconditional cash transfer:
The Mchinji Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme is part of the larger Malawi Social Protection Policy and Framework, and began in April 2006. It is mainly financed by UNICEF and the National AIDS Commission.[52] The objectives of the scheme are to reduce poverty of people in the pilot area who are ultra poor and labor constrained, increase school enrolment and attendance, and to generate information regarding the feasibility of a cash transfer program as part of a Social Protection Programme for Malawi. The goal for this program is to reduce the ultra poverty rate from the 22% rate in 2007 to 10% by 2015.[52]
This program targets those households that are ultra poor (See poverty for definition) and those who are labor constrained, defined as either a household in which no able-bodied members 19-64 can work due to chronic sickness or disability or a household with one-able bodied member that has to care for more than three dependents. About 22% of Malawi as of 2007 was ultra-poor, living on less than 20 cents a day, and of that group 10% are labor constrained.[52]
The program would give anywhere from 600 kwacha ($4 US) monthly for a one person household to 1800 kwacha ($13 US) monthly for a four or more person family. There is also an extra bonus of 200 kwacha for children enrolled in primary school and 400 kwacha for children enrolled in secondary school.[52] The location for the program is in the Mchinji District, the 14th poorest district out of 28 in Malawi.
It was chosen for its average poverty level of all the districts in Malawi and its proximity to the capital, Lilongwe.[52]
Jump up ^Glewwe, Paul; Kassouf, Ana Lucia. "The Impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Enrollment, Drop Out Rates and Grade Promotion in Brazil." August 2010
Jump up ^Palma, Julieta; Urzúa, Raúl. "Anti-poverty Policies and Citizenry: the Chile Solidario Experience." UNESCO Management of Social Transformations Policy Papers/12. Department of Public Policy. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Chile.
Jump up ^Ayala, Francisco. "The Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), Jamaica Inter-Regional Inequality Facility Policy Briefs 4, February 2006." Overseas Development Institute.
Jump up ^Damayanti, Arie (LPEM FEUI, Jakarta), Moeis, Jossy P. (LPEM FEUI, Jakarta), Sparrow, Robert (ISS, The Hague), Herawati, Yulia (World Bank Office, Jakarta). "Program Keluarga Harapan and PNPM-Generasi Baseline Survey – Preliminary Findings." World Bank. January 24, 2008
Jump up ^Moore, Charity. “Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program.” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
Jump up ^Rawlings, Laura B.;Rubio, Gloria M. "Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3119, August 2003.
Jump up ^Societies on the Move (2010, September 11). The Economist. 396(8699), pp. 11-15
Jump up ^Actuar Sobre el Futuro: Romper la Transmisión Intergeneracional de la Igualdad (2010). Regional Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean. UNDP
^ Jump up to: abc"Morocco: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education." Middle East and North Africa - Morocco: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education. World Bank, 2007. Web. [1].
Jump up ^Rawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America. World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 1-25.
^ Jump up to: abRawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. "Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 23
Jump up ^Moore, Charity. "Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
^ Jump up to: abRawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. "Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 20.
^ Jump up to: abcFizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 125.
Jump up ^Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 1- 245
Jump up ^Latapi, AugustÃn and Mercedes González de la Rocha. "Girls, Mothers,and Poverty Reduction in Mexico: Evaluating Progresa- Oportunidades" in Shahra Razavi (ed.), "The Gendered Impacts of Liberalization: Towards 'Embedded Liberalism?' London and New York: Routledge: 267- 289.
Jump up ^Latapi, AugustÃn and Mercedes González de la Rocha. "Girls, Mothers,and Poverty Reduction in Mexico: Evaluating Progresa- Oportunidades" in Shahra Razavi (ed.), "The Gendered Impacts of Liberalization: Towards 'Embedded Liberalism?'" London and New York: Routledge: 267- 289.
Jump up ^Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 1- 245.
Jump up ^Moore, Charity. "Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
^ Jump up to: abMoore, Charity. "Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 40.
Jump up ^Cohen, Mark and Dora Weissman. "Implementing a Conditional Cash Transfer Program In Haiti: Opportunities and Challenges." The International Food Policy Research Center. 2007
Jump up ^Bosman, Julie. "City will stop paying poor for good behavior." New York Times. March 30, 2010
Jump up ^Brauw, Alan De, and John Hoddinott. "Must Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Be Conditioned to Be Effective? The Impact of Conditioning Transfers on School Enrollment in Mexico." Journal of Development Economics (2010). Print.
Jump up ^Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Ozler. Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment. Working paper no. 5259. Vol. 45. World Bank, 2010. Print. Impact Evaluation Ser.
Jump up ^Künnemann, Ralf and Ralf Leonhard. A Human Rights View of Social Cash Transfers for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Brot für die Welt, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, 2008.
^ Jump up to: abcdeSchubert, Bernd, and Mayke Huijbregts. The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme, Preliminary Lessons Learned. Tech. New York: UNICEF, 2006. Print. Social Protection Initiatives for Children, Women and Families: An Analysis of Recent Experiences.
Hanlon, Joseph, Armando Barrientos and David Hulme (2010). Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
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