Showing posts with label economic theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic theory. Show all posts

Saturday, 11 May 2013

The Lessons of the North Atlantic Crisis for Economic Theory and Policy

Joseph_E._Stiglitz




Guest post by: Joseph E. Stiglitz


Columbia University, New York, and co-host of the Conference on Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons
(Versions in 中文, Français, 日本語, and Русский)
In analyzing the most recent financial crisis, we can benefit somewhat from the misfortune of recent decades. The approximately 100 crises that have occurred during the last 30 years—as liberalization policies became  dominant—have given us a wealth of experience and mountains of data.  If we look over a 150 year period, we have an even richer data set.
With a century and half of clear, detailed information on crisis after crisis, the burning question is not How did this happen? but How did we ignore that long history, and think that we had solved the problems with the business cycle? Believing that we had made big economic fluctuations a thing of the past took a remarkable amount of hubris.

Markets are not stable, efficient, or self-correcting
The big lesson that  this crisis forcibly brought home—one we should have long known—is that economies are not necessarily efficient, stable or self-correcting.
There are two parts to this belated revelation. One is that standard models had focused on exogenous shocks, and yet it’s very clear that a very large fraction of the perturbations to our economy are endogenous.  There are not only short‑run endogenous shocks; there are long‑run structural transformations and persistent shocks.  The models that focused on exogenous shocks simply misled us—the majority of the really big shocks come from within the economy.
Secondly, economies are not self-correcting.  It’s clear that we have yet to fully take on aboard this crucial lesson that we should have learned from this crisis: even in its aftermath, the tepid attempts to fix the economies of the United States and Europe have been a failure.  They certainly have not gone far enough.  The result is that we continue to face significant risks of another crisis in the future.
So too, the responses to the crisis have not brought our economies anywhere near back to full employment.  The loss in GDP between our potential and our actual output is in the trillions of dollars.
Of course, some will say that it could have been done worse, and that’s true. Considering that the people in charge of fixing the crisis included some of  the same ones who created it in the first place, it is perhaps  remarkable it hasn’t been a bigger catastrophe.
More than deleveraging, more than a balance sheet crisis: the need for structural transformation
In terms of human resources, capital stock, and natural resources, we’re roughly  at the same levels today that we were before the crisis.  Meanwhile, many countries have not regained their pre-crisis GDP levels, to say nothing of a return to the pre-crisis  growth paths. In a very fundamental sense, the crisis is still not fully resolved—and there’s no good economic theory that explains why that should be the case.
Some of this has to do with the issue of the slow pace of deleveraging.  But even as the economy deleverages, there is every reason to believe that it will not return to full employment.  We are not likely to return to the pre-crisis household savings rate of zero—nor would it be a good thing if we did.  Even if manufacturing has a slight recovery, most of the jobs that have been lost in that sector will not be regained.
Some have suggested that, looking at past data, we should resign ourselves to this unfortunate state of affairs.  Economies that have had severe financial crises typically recover slowly.  But the fact that things have often gone badly in the aftermath of  a financial crisis doesn’t mean they must go badly.
This is more than just a balance sheet crisis.  There is a deeper cause:  The United States and Europe are going through a  structural transformation.  There is a structural transformation associated with the move from manufacturing to a service sector economy.    Additionally, changing comparative advantages requires massive adjustments in the structure of the North Atlantic countries.
Reforms that are, at best, half-way measures
Markets by themselves do not in general lead to efficient, stable and socially acceptable outcomes.  This means we have to think a little bit more deeply about what kind of economic architectures will lead to growth, real stability, and a good distribution of income.
There is an ongoing debate about  whether we simply need to tweak the existing economic architecture or whether we need to make more fundamental changes.  I have two concerns.  One I hinted at earlier:  the reforms undertaken so far have only tinkered at the edges.  The second is that some of the changes in our economic structure (both before and after the crisis) that were supposed to make the economy perform better may not have done so.
There are some reforms, for instance, that may enable the economy to better withstand small shocks, but actually make it less able to absorb big shocks.  This is true of much of the financial sector integration that may have allowed the economy to absorb some of the smaller shocks, but clearly made the economy less resilient to fatter‑tail shocks.
It should be clear that many of the “improvements” in markets before the crisis actually increased countries’ exposure to risk.  Whatever the benefits that might be derived from capital and financial market liberalization (and they are questionable), there have been severe costs in terms of increased risk.  We ought to be rethinking attitudes towards these reforms—and the IMF should be commended for its rethinking in recent years.  One of the objectives of capital account management, in all of its forms, can be to reduce domestic volatility arising from a country’s international engagements.
More generally, the crisis has brought home the importance of financial regulation for macroeconomic stability.  But as I assess what has happened since the crisis, I feel disappointed.  With the mergers that have occurred in the aftermath of the crisis, the problem of too-big-to- fail banks has become even worse.  But the problem is not just with too-big-to-fail banks.  There are banks that are too intertwined to fail and banks that are too correlated to fail.  We have done little about any of these issues. There has, of course, been a huge amount of discussion about too- big-to-fail. But being too correlated is a distinct issue.  There is a strong need for a more diversified ecology of financial institutions that would reduce incentives to be excessively correlated and lead to greater stability.  This is a perspective that has not been emphasized nearly enough.
Also, we haven’t done enough to increase bank capital requirements.  Missing in much of the discussion is an assessment of the costs vs. benefits of higher capital requirements.  We know the benefits—a lower risk of a government bailout and a recurrence of the kinds of events that marked 2007 and 2008.  But on the cost side, we’ve paid too little attention to the  fundamental  insights of the Modigliani‑Miller Theorem, which explains the bogusness of arguments that increasing capital requirements will increase the cost of capital.
Deficiencies in reforms and in modeling
If we had begun our reform efforts with a focus on how to make our economy more efficient and more stable, there are other questions we would have naturally asked; other questions we would have posed.    Interestingly, there is some correspondence between these deficiencies in our reform efforts and the deficiencies in the models that we as economists often use in macroeconomics.
The importance of credit
We would, for instance, have asked what the fundamental roles of the financial sector are, and how we can get it to perform those roles better.  Clearly, one of the key roles is the allocation of capital and the provision of credit, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises, a function which it did not perform well before the crisis, and which arguably it is still not fulfilling well.
This might seem obvious. But a focus on the provision of credit has neither been at the center of policy discourse nor of the standard macro-models.  We have to shift our focus from money to credit.  In any balance sheet, the two sides are usually going to be very highly correlated.  But that is not always the case, particularly in the context of large economic perturbations.  In these, we ought to be focusing on credit.  I find it remarkable the extent to which there has been an inadequate examination in standard macro models of the nature of the credit mechanism. There is, of course, a large microeconomic literature on banking and credit, but for the most part, the insights of this literature has not been taken on board in standard macro-models.
But failing to manage credit is not the only lacuna in our approach.  There is also a lack of understanding of different kinds of finance.  A major area in the analysis of risk in financial markets is the difference between debt and equity.  And in standard macroeconomics, we have barely given this any attention. My book with Bruce Greenwald, Towards a New Paradigm of Monetary Economics ((Cambridge University Press, 2003) was an attempt to remedy this.
Stability
As I have already noted, in the conventional models (and in the conventional wisdom) market economies were stable.  And so it was perhaps not a surprise that fundamental questions about how to design more stable economic systems were seldom asked.  We have already touched on several aspects of this:  how to design economic systems that are less exposed to risk or that generate less volatility on their own.
One of the necessary reforms, but one not emphasized enough, is the need for more automatic stabilizers and fewer automatic destabilizers—not only in the financial sector, but throughout the economy. For instance, the movement from defined benefit to defined contribution systems may have led to a less stable economy.
Elsewhere, I have explained how risk sharing arrangements (especially if poorly designed) can actually lead to more systemic risk:  the pre-crisis conventional wisdom that diversification essentially eliminates risk is just wrong.  I’ve explored this is some detail in this article, along with this paper and this one.
Distribution
Distribution matters as well—distribution among individuals, between households and firms, among households, and among firms.  Traditionally, macroeconomics focused on certain aggregates, such as the average ratio of leverage to GDP.  But that and other average numbers often don’t give a picture of the vulnerability of the economy.
In the case of the financial crisis, such numbers didn’t give us warning signs. Yet it was the fact that a large number of people at the bottom couldn’t make their debt payments that should have tipped us off that something was wrong.
Across the board, our models need to incorporate a greater understanding of heterogeneity and its implications for economic stability.
Policy Frameworks
Flawed models not only lead to flawed policies, but also to flawed policy frameworks.
Should monetary policy focus just on short term interest rates? 
In monetary policy, there is a tendency to think that the central bank should only intervene in the setting of the short-term interest rate.  They believe “one intervention” is better than many.  Since at least 80 years ago with the work of Ramsey  we know that focusing on a single instrument is not generally the best approach.
The advocates of the “single intervention” approach argue that it is best, because it least distorts the economy.  Of course, the reason we have monetary policy in the first place—the reason why government acts to intervene in the economy—is that we don’t believe that markets on their own will set the right short-term interest rate.  If we did, we would just let free markets determine that interest rate.  The odd thing is that while just about every central banker would agree we should intervene in the determination of that price, not everyone is so convinced that we should strategically intervene in others, even though we know from the general theory of taxation and the general theory of market intervention that intervening in just one price is not optimal.
Once we shift the focus of our analysis to credit, and explicitly introduce risk into the analysis, we become aware that we need to use multiple instruments.  Indeed, in general, we want to use all the instruments at our disposal.  Monetary economists often draw a division between macro-prudential, micro-prudential, and conventional monetary policy instruments.  In our book Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, Bruce Greenwald and I argue that this distinction is artificial. The government needs to draw upon all of these instruments, in a coordinated way.  (I’ll return to this point shortly.)
Of course, we cannot “correct” every market failure. The very large ones, however—the macroeconomic failures—will always require our intervention.  Bruce Greenwald and I have pointed out that markets are never Pareto efficient if information is imperfect, if there are asymmetries of information, or if risk markets are imperfect.  And since these conditions are always satisfied, markets are never Pareto efficient.  Recent research has highlighted the importance of these and other related constraints for macroeconomics—though again, the insights of this important work have yet to be adequately integrated either into mainstream macroeconomic models or into mainstream policy discussions.
Price versus quantitative interventions
These theoretical insights also help us to understand why the old presumption among some economists that price interventions are preferable to quantity interventions is wrong.  There are many circumstances in which quantity interventions lead to better economic performance.
Tinbergen
A policy framework that has become popular in some circles argues that so long as there are as many instruments as there are objectives, the economic system is controllable, and the best way of managing the economy in such circumstances is to have an institution responsible for one target and one instrument.  (In this view, central banks have one instrument—the interest rate—and one objective—inflation.  We have already explained why limiting monetary policy to one instrument is wrong.)
Drawing such a division may have advantages from an agency or bureaucratic perspective, but from the point of view of managing macroeconomic policy—focusing on growth, stability and distribution, in a world of uncertainty—it makes no sense.  There has to be coordination across all the issues and among all the instruments that are at our disposal.  There needs to be close coordination between monetary and fiscal policy.  The natural equilibrium that would arise out of having different people controlling different instruments and focusing on different objectives is, in general, not anywhere near what is optimal in achieving overall societal objectives.  Better coordination—and the use of more instruments—-can, for instance, enhance economic stability.
Take this chance to revolutionize flawed models
It should be clear that we could have done much more to prevent this crisis and to mitigate its effects.   It should be clear too that we can do much more to prevent the next one. Still, through this conference and others like it, we are at least beginning to clearly identify the really big market failures, the big macroeconomic externalities, and the best policy interventions for achieving high growth, greater stability, and a better distribution of income.
To succeed, we must constantly remind ourselves that markets on their own are not going to solve these problems, and neither will a single intervention like short-term interest rates. Those facts have been proven time and again over the last century and a half.
And as daunting as the economic problems we now face are, acknowledging this will allow us to take advantage of the one big opportunity  this period of economic trauma has afforded: namely, the chance to revolutionize our flawed  models, and perhaps even exit from an interminable cycle of crises.

Tuesday, 19 March 2013

Synopsis of Social Credit

 

The following is a collaborative effort between Wally Klinck and myself (The blogger of Social Credit blogspot).

Introduction

The term Social Credit, as a formal name, originated from the writings of the British engineer and originator of the Social Credit movement, Clifford Hugh Douglas (1879-1952), who wrote a book by that name in 1924. Douglas, a civil engineer who had pursued his higher education at Cambridge University, had published previously, most notably in the British intellectual journal The New Age whose editor, Alfred Orage, became converted to Douglas’s ideas and, subsequently devoted The New Age and latterly The New English Weekly, after a ten year sojourn in the United States, to promulgation of those ideas until his death on the eve of his BBC speech on Social Credit, November 5, 1934, in the “Poverty in Plenty” Series. Douglas’s first book Economic Democracy was published in 1920, shortly after his article “The Delusion of Super-Production” appeared in 1918 in the English Review. Among Douglas’s other early works were The Control and Distribution of Production, Credit-Power and Democracy and Warning Democracy and The Monopoly of Credit. Of considerable interest is the Evidence that he presented to the Canadian House of Commons Select Committee on Banking and Commerce in 1923, to the British Parliamentary Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry in 1930, which included exchanges with economist J. M. Keynes, and to the Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature in 1934 during the term of the United Farmers of Alberta Government in that Canadian Province.

Douglas’s prolific writings spawned a worldwide movement, most prominent in the British Commonwealth but with beachheads in Europe and activities in the United States where Orage, during his sojourn there, promoted Douglas’s ideas. In the United States, the New Democracy group was headed by the American author Gorham Munson who contributed a major book on Social Credit titled Aladdin’s Lamp: The Wealth of the American People (New York: Creative Age Press, 1945.). While Canada and New Zealand had electoral successes with “Social Credit” political parties, the movement in England and Australia was primarily devoted to pressuring existing parties to implement Social Credit: this function was performed especially by Douglas’s Social Credit Secretariat in England and the Commonwealth Leagues of Rights especially in Australia. Douglas continued writing and contributing to the Secretariat’s journals, initially Social Credit and shortly thereafter The Social Crediter (which continues to be published by the Secretariat) for the remainder of his lifetime, concentrating more on political and philosophical issues in his later years.

Political History

In the early years of the movement in the UK there was strong pressure from trade unionists for the Labour Party to consider adopting ‘social credit’ ideals and policies. The Labour leadership proved hostile, however, essentially because its doctrines of Fabian socialism, with its hierarchical view of state-socialism, economic growth and full employment, were incompatible with such ideas as National Dividends and an end to wage/salary slavery. Certain British Labour economists expended considerable effort in an effort to discredit Social Credit. One of the leading Fabians is said to have declared that they didn’t care whether Douglas was technically correct or not—they simply did not like his policy!

In 1935 the first “Social Credit” government was elected in Alberta, Canada under the leadership of William Aberhart. “Bible Bill”, as he was also known, was a high school mathematics teacher and radio evangelist who was given a book on Social Credit, titled The Meaning of Social Credit, written by the English author and actor Maurice Colborne, and decided Douglas’s theories were exactly what Alberta needed to escape the depression. Douglas, having counseled the previous United Farmers of Alberta Provincial Government was sought as an advisor to Aberhart, but withdrew shortly after due to disagreements, or misunderstandings, in policy and strategy. Under the pressures of dealing with the extreme conditions of the Great Depression and being unable to understand Douglas’s advice Aberhart sought the assistance of a representative of orthodox finance to put the Provinces finances in order. The difficult and strained correspondece between Aberhart and Douglas was published by Douglas in his book The Alberta Experiment (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937).

The Premier wanted to balance the provincial budget, and Douglas stated that the concept of a balanced budget was completely inconsistent with the use of Social Credit, because of the arithmetic impossibility, under the existing rules of financial cost accountancy, of balancing all budgets within an economy simultaneously. (“The Fallacy of a Balanced Budget,” The New English Weekly, July 28, 1932, pp. 346-7) In a letter to Aberhart, Douglas stated, "This seems to be a suitable occasion on which to emphasise the proposition that a Balanced Budget is quite inconsistent with the use of Social Credit [i.e., Real Credit—the ability to deliver goods and services “as, when and where required”] in the modern world, and is simply a statement in accounting figures that the progress of the country is stationary, i.e., that it consumes exactly what it produces, including capital assets. The result of the acceptance of this proposition is that all capital appreciation becomes quite automatically the property of those who create an issue of money [i.e., the banking system] and the necessary unbalancing of the Budget is covered by Debts."

Two other expert Social Credit technical advisors, L. Denis Byrne and George F. Powell, were sent from the United Kingdom by Douglas, but all attempts to pass Social Credit legislation were ruled ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada and Privy Council in London. In desperation, William Aberhart attempted to implement the monetary theories of Silvio Gesell by issuing a form of scrip known as "prosperity certificates", which depreciated in value the longer they were held. Douglas, however, was not impressed by Gesell's theories and openly criticized them. "Gesell's theory was that the trouble with the world was that people saved money so that what you had to do was to make them spend it faster. Disappearing money is the heaviest form of continuous taxation ever devised. The theory behind this idea of Gesell's was that what is required is to stimulate trade - that you have to get people frantically buying goods - a perfectly sound idea so long as the objective of life is merely trading." (" The Approach To Reality")

The Alberta Social Credit Party, under Ernest Manning who succeeded Aberhart after his untimely death, slowly departed from its roots and became popularly identified as a right wing populist movement. Meanwhile, Douglas published in the Secretariat’s journal “An Act for the Better Management of the Credit of Alberta” (The Social Crediter, February 8, 1947). Subsequently, in the same journal, he wrote a critical analysis of what went wrong with Social Credit in Alberta (“Social Credit in Alberta”, August 28/September 4-11, 1948) in which he said, “The Manning administration is no more a Social Credit administration than the British government is Labor”. Social Credit also formed governments in British Columbia, Canada, but again the party had little in common with Douglas and his theories. Social Credit Parties also enjoyed some national electoral successes in Canada, with support from Western Canada and more notably from Quebec. Social Credit parties also had some electoral successes in New Zealand.

Political Theory

Douglas opposed the formation of Social Credit Parties, because he felt that a group of elected amateurs should never direct a group of competent experts in technical matters. ( “The Approach to Reality,” Address at Westminster, March 7, 1936.) The goal of politicians should be to pressure the experts to get the policy results desired by the populace, but the experts are ultimately responsible for achieving those results. “The proper function of Parliament, I may perhaps be allowed to repeat, is to force all activities of a public nature to be carried on so that the individuals who comprise the public may derive the maximum benefit from them. Once the idea is grasped, the criminal absurdity of the party system becomes evident.” ("The Tragedy of Human Effort,” Address at Central Hall, Liverpool, October 30, 1936.) Therefore, Social Credit supported by effective public demand could be implemented by any political party, and once implemented, achieving a realistic integration of means and ends, party politics would cease to exist. Douglas defined democracy as the “will of the people”, not rule by the majority. It is the right of the individual to choose freely one thing at a time, and to contract out of unsatisfactory associations. Traditional ballot-box democracy is incompatible with Social Credit, and Douglas advocated what he called the “responsible vote”, where anonymity in the voting process no longer existed. "The individual voter must be made individually responsible, not collectively taxable, for his vote." ("Realistic Consitutionalism")


The establishment of the supremacy of common law is essential to ensuring the rights of individuals are protected from an all powerful parliament. Douglas believed that the constitution was an organism, not an organization. He also believed that the effectiveness of the British government was structurally determined by its application of the Christian concept known as Trinitarianism. "In some form or other, sovereignty in the British Isles for the last two thousand years has been Trinitarian. Whether we look on this Trinitarianism under the names of King, Lords and Commons or as Policy, Sanctions and Administration, the Trinity-in-Unity has existed, and our national success has been greatest when the balance (never perfect) has been approached. ("Realistic Constitutionalism")

Economic Theory

Douglas disagreed with classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo who divided the factors of production into land, labour and capital. He also disagreed with Marx who claimed that labour created all wealth. Douglas believed the “cultural inheritance of society” was the primary factor in production. Our cultural inheritance is defined as the knowledge, technique and processes that have been handed down to us incrementally from the origins of civilization. Consequently, we do not have to keep “reinventing the wheel”. “We are merely the administrators of that cultural inheritance, and to that extent the cultural inheritance is the property of all of us, without exception.” (“The Monopolistic Idea,” Address at the Melbourne Town Hall, Australia, January 22, 1934.)

Douglas also criticized classical economics because it was based upon a barter economy; whereas, the modern economy is a monetary one. To the orthodox economist, money is a medium of exchange. This may have once been the case when the majority of wealth was produced by individuals who exchanged it with each other, but in the modern economy, where production is split up into multiple processes, wealth is produced by people working in association with each other. For instance, any automobile worker does not produce any wealth by himself ; the wealth that is produced (i.e., the automobile) is only produced in conjunction with other auto workers, the producers of roads, gasoline, insurance etc. Therefore, wealth is a pool upon which people can draw, and the efficiency gained by individuals co-operating in the productive process in known as the “unearned increment of association”—historic accumulations of which constitute what Douglas called the Cultural Heritage. The means of drawing upon this pool are the tickets distributed by the banking system.

Money originally came from the productive system, when cattle owners punched leather discs which represented a head of cattle. These discs could then be exchanged for corn, and the corn producers could then exchange the disc for a head of cattle at a later date. The word “pecuniary” comes from the Latin “pecus,” meaning cattle. Today, the productive system and the distributive/monetary system are two separate entities. Douglas was one of the first to understand that loans create deposits, and he gave a short mathematical proof of this in his book Social Credit. Bank credit comprises the vast majority of money, and is created every time a bank makes a loan. Douglas was also one of the first to understand the creditary nature of money. The word credit derives from the Latin “credere”, meaning to believe. “The essential quality of money, therefore, is that a man shall believe that he can get what he wants by the aid of it.” (C.H. Douglas, “Engineering, Money and Prices,” Paper read at the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, April 22, 1927, reprinted in Warning Democracy, 1935, p. 15)

Money should not be regarded as a commodity but rather as a ticket, a means of distribution of production (“The Use of Money,” Address in St. James’ Theatre, Christchurch, New Zealand, February 13, 1934, p. 11, 13.) “There are two sides to this question of a ticket representing something that we can call, if we like, a value. There is the ticket itself--the money which forms the thing we call ‘effective demand’—and there is something we call a price opposite to it.” (“The Use of Money,” op cit., p. 15) Money is effective demand, and the means of reclaiming that money are prices and taxes. As real capital replaces labour in the process of modernization money should become increasingly an instrument of distribution.

Douglas also claimed the problem of production, or scarcity, had long been solved. The new problem was one of distribution. Douglas criticized the banking system on two counts: 1) for being a form of government which has been centralizing its power for centuries, and 2) for claiming ownership to the money they create. The latter he claimed was equivalent to claiming ownership of the nation. (“Dictatorship by Taxation,” An Address delivered in the Ulster Hall, Belfast, November 24, 1936.) Money, Douglas claimed, was merely an abstract representation of the real credit of the community, which is the ability of the community to deliver goods and services, when, and where they are required.

The first article to appear in the New Age, edited by A.R. Orage, titled “A Mechanical View of Economics” appeared in January, 1919. In this article, we get a glimpse of Douglas’s concerns in regards to the methods by which economic activity is measured when he says, “It is not the purpose of this short article to depreciate the services of accountants; in fact, under the existing conditions probably no body of men has done more to crystallize the data on which we carry on the business of the world; but the utter confusion of thought which has undoubtedly arisen from the calm assumption of the book-keeper and the accountant that he and he alone was in a position to assign positive or negative values to the quantities represented by his figures is one of the outstanding curiosities of the industrial system; and the attempt to mold the activities of a great empire on such a basis is surely the final condemnation of an out-worn method."

Just over a year later, in his book Credit-Power and Democracy (1920), we see Douglas's critique of accounting methodology as it pertains to income and prices in his famous “A+B theorem”. This was not a theory but a theorem. Quoting from the fourth, Australian Edition of 1933:

"A factory or other productive organization has, besides its economic function as a producer of goods, a financial aspect—it may be regarded on the one hand as a device for the distribution of purchasing-power to individuals through the media of wages, salaries, and dividends; and on the other hand as a manufactory of prices—financial values. From this standpoint its payments may be divided into two groups:
Group A - All payments made to individuals (wages, salaries, and dividends).
Group B - All payments made to other organizations (raw materials, bank charges, and other external costs).

Now the rate of flow of purchasing-power to individuals is represented by A, but since all payments go into prices, the rate of flow of prices cannot be less than A+B. The product of any factory may be considered as something which the public ought to be able to buy, although in many cases it is an intermediate product of no use to individuals but only to a subsequent manufacture; but since A will not purchase A+B; a proportion of the product at least equivalent to B must be distributed by a form of purchasing-power which is not comprised in the description grouped under A. It will be necessary at a later stage to show that this additional purchasing power is provided by loan credit (bank overdrafts) or export credit.”. (C.H. Douglas, Credit-Power and Democracy, Aust. Edition, 1933, pp. 22-23)

The theorem itself demonstrates that total prices rise faster than total incomes when regarded as a flow. Douglas proposed to eliminate this problem by giving “debt-free” credits to consumers in the form of a price rebate and a dividend, called formally a Compensated Price and a National (or Consumer) Dividend. A National Credit Office would be charged with the task of calculating the size of the rebate and dividend by determining a national balance sheet, and keeping track of aggregate production and consumption statistics. The price rebate is based upon the observation that the real cost of production is the mean rate of consumption over the mean rate of production for an equivalent period of time. The physical cost of producing something is the materials and capital that were consumed in its production, plus that amount of Labor consumed during its production. This total consumption represents the physical cost of production. Since less inputs are consumed to produce a unit of output as technology advances, and total production increases relative to total consumption over time, the real cost of production is falling over time; hence, prices should be falling with the progression of time.

The price rebate (Compensated Price) is designed to realize this fact. The Dividend is based upon the fact that Labor is being displaced in the productive process due to increases in productivity. Since Labor is being replaced in the productive process, people should be free to consume while enjoying an increasing amount of leisure as machines displace them. The Dividend would give people this freedom. Further, Labor displacement in the productive process implies that overhead charges {B}Bare increasing in relation to income (A), because “B is the financial representation of the lever of capital” (C.H. Douglas Credit Power and Democracy, Aust. Edition, 1933, p. 25). This means that any attempt to stabilize or increase income is met with rising prices. If A is constant or increasing, and B is increasing due to technological advances, then A+B (prices) must also be increasing. From this perspective, inflation and unemployment are trade offs (re the Phillips Curve), unless prices are reduced from debt- free monies that do not derive from the productive system.

The cause of these “B” payments, or overhead charges, is described by Douglas in his pamphlet entitled, "The New and The Old Economics" when he says, “I think that a little consideration will make it clear that in this sense an overhead charge is any charge in respect of which the actual distributed purchasing power does not still exist, and that practically this means any charge created at a further distance in the past than the period of cyclic rate of circulation of money. There is no fundamental difference between tools and intermediate products, and the latter may therefore be included.” The cyclic rate of circulation of money measures the amount of time that it takes for a loan to go through the productive system and to come back to the bank. This can be calculated by determining the amount of clearings through the bank in a year divided by the average amount of deposits held at the banks (which varies very little). This number will give you the amount of times money must turnover in order to produce these clearing house figures. Douglas estimated the cyclic rate of circulation of money to be approximately three weeks. As Douglas said in his testimony before the Alberta Agricultural Committee of the Alberta Legislature in 1934, “Now we know there are an increasing number of charges which originated from a period much anterior to three weeks, and included in those charges, as a matter of fact, are most of the charges made in, respect of purchases from one organization to another, but all such charges as capital charges (for instance, on a railway which was constructed a year, two years, three years, five or ten years ago, where charges are still extant), cannot be liquidated by a stream of purchasing power which does not increase in volume and which has a period of three weeks. The consequence is, you have a piling up of debt, you have in many cases a diminution of purchasing power being equivalent to the price of the goods for sale.” (p. 90)

We see the major consequence of the problem that Douglas identified is exponentially increasing debt. Other less noticeable consequences are that society is either forced to engage in production that the consumer does not want, or production he cannot purchase. The latter represents a “favorable balance of trade”, meaning a country exports more than it imports. The former represents excessive capital production and/or military buildup. The problem with pursuing a favorable balance of trade is that not every country can pursue this objective at the same time, since it is necessary for a country to import more than it exports if another exports more than it imports. The long-term consequence of this policy is a trade war, ultimately resulting in real war. Hence, the Social Credit admonition, as expressed by the Social Credit Party of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, led by John Hargrave, that “He who calls for Full-Employment calls for War!” Excessive capital production is only a temporary fix because the cost of the capital ultimately shows up in the cost of consumer goods, or taxes, which only goes to further exacerbate the gap between income and prices at a later date. Military buildup necessitates either it’s use, or stockpiling of weapons leading to inventory accumulation.

Philosophy

Douglas warned against viewing Social Credit solely as a scheme of monetary reform. He described Social Credit as a policy of a philosophy. He coined this philosophy “practical Christianity.” Douglas believed there was a Canon which ran through the universe, and Jesus Christ was the Incarnation of this Canon. However, he also felt that Christianity remained ineffective so long as it remained transcendental. Religion, which derives from the Latin word relegare, meaning to “bind back”, was supposed to be a binding back to reality. Christianity was only effective to the extent that it was rooted in existence. Although Douglas defined Social Credit as a philosophy with Christian roots, he did not envision a Christian theocracy. Social Credit society recognizes the fact that the relationship between man and God is unique. Therefore, it is essential to allow man the greatest possible freedom in order to pursue this relationship. If people are given the economic security and leisure achievable in the context of a Social Credit dispensation, most would end their service to mammon and use their free time pursuing spiritual, intellectual, or cultural goals leading to self-development. Douglas did not believe that religion should be thrust upon anyone through force of law or external compulsion. He emphasized that all policy derives from its respective philosophy and that “. . . Society is primarily metaphysical, and must have regard to the organic relationships of its prototype.”

Douglas said that Social Crediters wants to build a new civilization based upon absolute economic security for the individual—where “. . . they shall sit every man [individual] under his [her] vine and under his [her] fig tree; and none shall make them afraid.” (Micah iv, 4 quoted on the cover of the Douglas Quarterly Review, The Fig Tree, New Series. 1954-55.) In keeping with this goal, Douglas was opposed to all forms of taxation on real property. This set Social Credit at variance from the land-taxing recommendations of the Henry George School.

Douglas opposed what he termed “the pyramid of power.” Totalitarianism reflects this pyramid and is the antithesis of Social Credit. It turns the government into an end instead of a means, and the individual into a means instead of an end—Demon est deus inversus—“the devil is God upside down.” Social Credit is designed to give the individual the maximum freedom allowable given the need for association in economic, political and social matters. Liberty in politics is dependent on the metaphysical concept of free will, for what use is the purpose of liberty if man is not free to choose? Social Credit rejects dialectical materialistic philosophy. Douglas divided philosophy into two schools of thought that he labeled the "classical school" and the "modern school", which are broadly represented by philosophies of Aristotle and Bacon respectively. Douglas was critical of both schools of thought, but believed that "the truth lies in appreciation of the fact that neither conception is useful without the other". (C.H. Douglas: Social Credit. ISBN 0-087968-107-1, p. 6) Social Credit philosophy is best summed by Douglas when he said, “Systems were made for men, and not men for systems, and the interest of man which is self-development, is above all systems, whether theological, political or economic.” (Economic Democracy, Fourth Revised and. Enlarged Edition, 1934, p 18.)

Critics to A+B and Rebuttal

Critics to the theorem argue there is no difference between A and B payments, and Social Credit policies are inflationary. These criticisms are based upon the quantity theory of money, which states that the quantity of money multiplied by its velocity of circulation equals total purchasing power. Following is a brief explanation of the quantity theory of money:
"MV=PQ:

where

M=quantity of money in the hands of the public

P=average level of prices

Q=quantity of output (that is real national product or real national income).

Thus, PQ = national product, measured in nominal (dollar) terms

And V = income velocity of money, that is, the average number of times that the money stock (M) is spent to buy final output during a year. Specifically, V is defined as being equal to PQ/M

Suppose that the money stock is $20 billion. Assume that, in the course of a year, the average dollar bill and the average chequing deposit are spent twelve times to purchase final goods and services. In other words, V is 12. Then, total spending for final output is $20 billion times 12, or $240 billion. In turn, this total spending (MV) equals the total quantity of goods and services (Q) times the average price (P) at which they were sold.

But how can the same dollar be used over and over to purchase final goods? Very simply. When you purchase groceries at the store, the $50 you pay does not disappear. Rather, it goes into the cash register of the store. From there, it is used to pay the farmer for fresh vegetables, the canning factory for canned goods, or the clerk's wages. The farmer or the clerk or the employee of the canning factory will in turn use the money to purchase goods. Once more, the same money is used for final purchases. The same dollar bill can circulate round and round." (Blomqvist, Wonnacott and Wonnacott, "Economics First Canadian Edition" ISBN: 0-07-54815-X: p. 247-248)

It was written in a committee report to the Alberta government in regards to the quantity theory of money: “The fallacy in the theory lies in the incorrect assumption that money "circulates", whereas it is issued against production, and withdrawn as purchasing power as the goods are bought for consumption. “ (“The Alberta Post-War Reconstruction Committee Report of the Subcommittee on Finance") Because all money is created as a debt that needs to be repaid, money does not circulate, but instead operates in an accounting cycle. If a retailer receives money from a customer for its product, the total sum of this money is neither profit, nor income. A retailer has debts to repay, or it must replace working capital. These sums are subtracted from revenues when determining profits. Neither is the profit entirely income; taxes must be paid, and a portion may be re-invested back into the business. Therefore, of the money received from the customer, the retailer may find that only a very small percentage is actually distributed as income that can then be spent on goods or services, the rest is either used to repay debts, replace working capital, or re-invested back into the firm. The fallacy is that the same dollar bill can "circulate round and round"; in reality, money is created as a debt that needs to be repaid. Every loan creates a deposit, and every repayment of a loan destroys a deposit. Therefore; money does not "circulate round and round" but is created and destroyed through the creation of loans and their repayment.

Other critics argue that if the gap between income and prices exists as Douglas claimed, the economy would have collapsed in short order. They also argue that there are periods of time in which purchasing power is in excess of the price of consumer goods for sale.

Douglas replied to these criticisms in his testimony before the Alberta Agricultural Committee when he said, "What people who say that forget is that we were piling up debt at that time at the rate of ten millions sterling a day and if it can be shown, and it can be shown, that we are increasing debt continuously by normal operation of the banking system and the financial system at the present time, then that is proof that we are not distributing purchasing power sufficient to buy the goods for sale at that time; otherwise we should not be increasing debt, and that is the situation." (p. 90)

Incomes are paid out to workers during a multi-stage program of production, and according to the convention of accepted orthodox rules of accountancy, said incomes, are part of the financial cost and price of the final product when it is ready for use at the point of retail sale. For the product to be purchased with incomes earned in respect of its manufacture, all of these incomes would have to be saved until the product’s completion. In the real world earned incomes are largely, and necessarily, spent on past production to meet the present needs of living, and will not be available to purchase goods completed in the future –goods which must include the sum of incomes paid out during their period of manufacture in their price . Because the cyclic rate of circulation of money takes less time than the cancellation of the costs that the money created, orthodox economics can only allow access to the final products of industry by the mechanism of increasing consumer debt that constitutes a mortgage against future incomes. This does not liquidate the financial cost of production inasmuch as it merely passes charges of one accountancy period on as mounting charges against future periods. In other words, supply does not create enough demand to liquidate all the costs of production: Social Credit denies the validity of "Says Law" in economics.

Literary Figures in Social Credit

As lack of finance has been a constant impediment to the development of the arts and literature, the concept of economic democracy through Social Credit had immediate appeal in literary circles. Names associated with Social Credit include Charlie Chaplin, William Carlos Williams, Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, Herbert Read, Aldous Huxley, Storm Jameson, Eimar O’Duffy, Sybil Thorndyke, Bonamy DobrÈe and the American publisher James Laughlin . In 1933 Eimar O’Duffy published Asses in Clover, a science fiction fantasy exploration of social credit themes. His social credit economics book Life and Money: Being a Critical Examination of the Principles and Practice of Orthodox Economics with A Practical Scheme to End the Muddle it has made of our Civilisation, was endorsed by Douglas.

Summary

In Social Credit terminology, the words “Economic Democracy” do not mean worker control of industry. They mean conditions of consumer sovereignty wherein the consumer establishes the policy of production through exercise of his money-vote, fully provided with adequate purchasing power. The policy of production is so to be removed from the banking institutions, the government and industry. Social Credit envisages an “aristocracy of producers, serving and accredited by a democracy of consumers.” (C. H. Douglas) The true purpose of production is consumption and production must serve the genuine, freely expressed interests of consumers. Each citizen is to have a beneficial, not direct, inheritance in the communal capital—conferred by complete and dynamic access to the fruits of industry assured by the National Dividend and Compensated Price.Social Credit is distributive and its policy is to disperse power to individuals. “The only safe place for power is in many hands.”

Friday, 1 February 2013

Physiocracy



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Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, a prominent Physiocrat, emigrated to the US and his son founded DuPont, the world's second largest chemicals company. In his book la Physiocratie, du Pont advocated low tariffs and free trade.
Physiocracy (from the Greek for "Government of Nature") is an economic theory developed by the Physiocrats, a group of economists who believed that the wealth of nations was derived solely from the value of "land agriculture" or "land development." Their theories originated in France and were most popular during the second half of the 18th century. Physiocracy is perhaps the first well-developed theory of economics.
The movement was particularly dominated by François Quesnay (1694–1774) and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–1781).[1] It immediately preceded the first modern school, classical economics, which began with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776.
The most significant contribution of the Physiocrats was their emphasis on productive work as the source of national wealth. This is in contrast to earlier schools, in particular mercantilism, which often focused on the ruler's wealth, accumulation of gold, or the balance of trade. At the time the Physiocrats were formulating their ideas, economies were almost entirely agrarian. That is presumably why the theory considered only agricultural labor to be valuable. Physiocrats viewed the production of goods and services as consumption of the agricultural surplus, since the main source of power was from human or animal muscle and all energy was derived from the surplus from agricultural production.
The perceptiveness of the Physiocrats' recognition of the key significance of land was reinforced in the following half-century, when fossil fuels had been harnessed through the use of steam power. Productivity increased manyfold. Railways, and steam-powered water supply and sanitation systems, made possible cities of several millions, with land values many times greater than agricultural land. Thus, whilst modern economists also recognise manufacturing as productive and wealth-creating, the underlying principles laid down by the Physiocrats remain valid. Physiocracy also has an important contemporary relevance in that all life remains dependent on the productivity of the raw soil and the ability of the natural environment to renew itself.
Historian David B. Danbom explains, "The Physiocrats damned cities for their artificiality and praised more natural styles of living. They celebrated farmers."[2] They called themselves économistes, but are generally referred to as physiocrats to distinguish them from the many schools of economic thought that followed them.

Contents

[edit] Precursors

Physiocracy is an agrarianist philosophy. In the late Roman Republic, the dominant senatorial class was not allowed to engage in banking or commerce[3] but relied on their latifundia, large plantations, for income. They circumvented this rule through freedmen proxies who sold surplus agricultural goods.
After the decline of the Roman Empire, de-urbanization led to commerce ceasing and trade declining throughout most of western Europe. Economies became centered around agricultural manors where warrior-landlords, the medieval nobility, collected rent from their serfs in the form of produce. This was the dominant economic system until trade began to revive in the Late Middle Ages, fostering the rise of the merchant class.
Another inspiration came from China's economic system, then the largest in the world. Chinese society broadly distinguished four occupations, with scholar-bureaucrats, who were also agrarian landlords, at the top and merchants at the bottom (because they did not produce but only distributed goods made by others). Leading physiocrats like François Quesnay were avid Confucianists who advocated China's agrarian policies.[4] Some scholars have advocated connections with the school of Agriculturalism, which promoted utopian communalism.[5]

[edit] History

Pierre Le Pesant, sieur de Boisguilbert served as a member of Louis XIV's local administration of Paris, and wrote pamphlets and booklets on subjects related to his work: taxation, grain trade, and money. Le Pesant asserted that wealth came from self-interest and markets are connected by money flows (i.e. an expense for the buyer is revenue for the producer). Thus he realized that lowering prices in times of shortage – common at the time – is dangerous economically as it acted as a disincentive to production. Generally, Le Pesant advocated less government interference in the grain market, as any such interference would generate "anticipations" which would prevent the policy from working. For instance, if the government bought corn abroad, some people would speculate that there is likely to be a shortage and would buy more corn, leading to higher prices and more of a shortage. This was an early example of advocacy of free trade. In anonymously published tracts, Vauban proposed a system known as La dîme royale: this involved major simplification of the French tax code by switching to a relatively flat tax on property and trade. Vauban's use of statistics contrasted with earlier empirical methods in economics.[6]
Around the time of the Seven Years' War between France and England (1756-63), the physiocracy movement grew. Several journals appeared, signaling an increasing audience in France for new economic ideas. Among the most important were the Journal Œconomique (1721–72), which promoted agronomy and rational husbandry and the Journal du commerce (1759–62), which was heavily influenced by the Irishman Richard Cantillon (1680–1734), both dominated by physiocrats; the Journal de l'agriculture, du commerce et des finances (1765–74) and the Ephémérides du citoyen (1767–72 and 1774–76). Also, de Gournay (1712–59), the Intendant du commerce, brought together a group of young researchers including François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais (1722–1800) and one of the two most famous physiocrats, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–81). The other, François Quesnay (1694–1774), was among those writing prolifically in contemporary journals.[1]
In the 19th century Henry George in the United States advocated the collection of land rent as the primary if not the sole source of public revenue.

[edit] Tableau économique

The Tableau économique or Economic Table is an economic model first described by François Quesnay in 1759, which laid the foundation of the Physiocrats’ economic theories.[7]
The model Quesnay created consisted of three economic agents: the "proprietary" class consisted only of landowners; the "productive" class consisted of agricultural laborers; the "sterile" class was made up of artisans and merchants. The flow of production and/or cash between the three classes originated with the proprietary class because they owned the land and bought from both of the other classes.

[edit] Characteristics

[edit] Natural Order

The Physiocrats thought there was a "Natural order" that allowed human beings to live together. Men did not come together via a somewhat arbitrary "social contract". Rather, we have to discover the laws of the natural order that will allow individuals to live in society without losing significant freedoms.[8]

[edit] Individualism and laissez-faire

The Physiocrats, especially Turgot, believed that self-interest is the motivation for each segment of the economy to play its role. Each individual is best suited to determine what goods he wants and what work would provide him with what he wants out of life. While a person might labor for the benefit of others, he will work harder for his own benefit; however, each person's needs are being supplied by many other people. The system works best when there is a complementary relationship between one person's needs and another person's desires, and trade restrictions place an unnatural barrier to achieving one's goals.

[edit] Private property

None of the theories concerning the value of land could work without strong legal support for the ownership of private property. Combined with the strong sense of individualism, private property becomes a critical component of the Tableau's functioning.

[edit] Diminishing returns

Turgot was one of the first to recognize that “successive applications of the variable input will cause the product to grow, first at an increasing rate, later at a diminishing rate until it reaches a maximum.”[9] This was a recognition that the productivity gains required to increase national wealth had an ultimate limit, and, therefore, wealth was not infinite.

[edit] Investment capital

Both Quesnay and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune recognized that capital was needed by farmers to start the production process, and both were proponents of using some of each year’s profits to increase productivity. Capital was also needed to sustain the laborers while they produced their product. Turgot recognizes that there is opportunity cost and risk involved in using capital for something other than land ownership, and he promotes interest as serving a “strategic function in the economy.”[10]

[edit] See also

[edit] People

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ a b Steiner (2003) p62
  2. ^ Why Americans Value Rural Life by David B. Danbom
  3. ^ Byrd, 34
  4. ^ Derk Bodde, CHINESE IDEAS IN THE WEST
  5. ^ Maverick, Lewis A. (1938). "Chinese Influences Upon the Physiocrats". Economic History 3.
  6. ^ Steiner (2003) p61
  7. ^ Henry William Spiegel (1983) The Growth of Economic Thought, Revised and Expanded Edition, Duke University Press. p.189
  8. ^ A history of economic doctrines from the time of the physiocrats to the present day[page needed]
  9. ^ Spiegel (1983) p.195
  10. ^ Spiegel (1983) p.196

[edit] References