Showing posts with label japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label japan. Show all posts

Tuesday, 19 February 2013

Abenomics

Abenomics Is Back: Shinzo Abe Returns As Japanese PM Following Crushing LDP Victory

Tyler Durden's picture
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 12/16/2012 11:15 -0400    Zero Hedge



To little surprise, and confirming the pre-election polls, Shinzo Abe, who previously was Prime Minister of Japan from September 2006 to September 2007, has just won a second chance in today's Japanese election, following a crushing defeat by the LDP and the concession moments ago of challenger Yoshihiko Noda (who will no longer be watchim\ng, watching, watching). As BBC reports "The LDP, which enjoyed almost 50 years of unbroken rule until 2009, is projected to have an overall majority in the new parliament. Mr Abe has already served a Japan's Prime Minister between 2006 and 2007. He campaigned on a pledge to end 20 years of economic stagnation and to direct a more assertive foreign policy at a time of tensions with China. He is seen as a hawkish, right-of-centre leader whose previous term in office ended ignominiously amid falling popularity and a resignation on grounds of ill health. But Japanese media project big gains for his LDP who they say are on course to win between 275 to 310 seats in the 480-member house." In other words, with Japan's sharp turn to the right, this time will be different, and Abe will succeed where previously he failed miserably, or so the people, who have long abandoned any hope of an economic recovery, dare to hope.
What happens next? One word: Abenomics:
By contrast, Mr Abe has promised more public spending, looser monetary policy, and to allow nuclear energy a role to play in resource-poor Japan's future despite last year's nuclear disaster at Fukushima.

But economists say there is little new in Mr Abe's policies, or 'Abenomics' as they have been called. They have been adopted by previous LDP governments without successfully renewing the Japanese economy.

Mr Abe has also called for a tough stance on a territorial row with China over islands in the East China Sea that both countries claim.

But neither of the main parties fully convinced voters. Several new parties contested the poll and the right-leaning Japan Restoration Party founded by the mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto. could win as many as 50 seats.

And the nationalist former governor of Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara, whose bid to buy disputed islands provoked a fierce diplomatic showdown with China, may also have won a seat in parliament according to Japanese media.
One thing appears certain: Japan, which is the grand Keynesian experiment in keeping bond yields in check even as sovereign debt/GDP is approaching 250%, may have some trouble with the coolness and calmness of bond investors now that Abe has even threatened with making the BOJ a branch of the government, setting 3% inflation targets, and outright monetizing the debt (without even the courtesy of semantical coverage).
In fact, as Bloomberg summarizes, Abe is the worst premier for JGBs since 1994:
Shinzo Abe, the front-runner to replace Yoshihiko Noda in elections this weekend, oversaw a 1.2 percent gain when he was in office for a year through September 2007, the least since a loss in the two months that Tsutomu Hata was in power in 1994. In the 15 months under Noda’s watch, JGBs returned 3.2 percent, the most among the six successors to Junichiro Koizumi, who stepped down in 2006, data compiled by the European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies and Bloomberg show.

“Noda has been friendly to the bond market, and he literally risked his political career for Japan’s fiscal consolidation,” Shunsuke Doi, a market analyst in Tokyo at SMBC Nikko Securities Inc., one of the 25 primary dealers obliged to bid at government debt sales, said on Dec. 12. “An Abe administration would be an unfriendly environment for bonds, and super-long term yields are more likely to remain high in years ahead.”

Longer-term bonds are signaling concern about Japan’s fiscal health. The yield premium on 20-year JGBs over 10-year securities climbed to 99 basis points on Dec. 5, the highest since 1999. That compares with a gap of 68 basis points for similar maturity U.S. Treasuries.

Abe’s September 2007 statement for resignation from Japan’s top office made no mention of his economic record except for a growth strategy “centered on innovation and openness.” It listed the upgrade of Japan’s defense agency to a ministry-level position among his achievements.

Japan’s debt has climbed to 237 percent of its annual economic output, the most in the world, compared with 183 percent in 2007 during Abe’s previous tenure as prime minister, according to data estimates by the International Monetary Fund.
The fact that something is rapidly changing in Japan can be confirmed by the following comparison of Japan vs US 10s30s, where suddenly Japan is getting far more concerned about the long end even compared to the country run by Blackhawk Ben:


and stand alone... JGB 10s30s at record steeps...

"Not so honest" Abe's return deserved a special mention in the latest Privateer letter by Bill Buckler:
The man of the hour in Japan right now is Shinzo Abe, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the man almost universally expected to become the new Japanese Prime Minister on December 16. Mr Abe has been the Prime Minister before - as recently as 2006. His resignation in 2007 ushered in the modern era of “annual governments”. If Mr Abe gains the top spot this time, he will become the sixth Japanese Prime Minister since he last held the job in 2007.

The policies Mr Abe is selling, the ones which are expected to lead to his electoral victory, have been dubbed “Abenomics” by the Japanese media. Mr Abe wants to further increase what is so politely called “monetary easing”. He also wants to embark on yet more infrastructure projects while at the same time pushing the exchange value of the Yen down to foster the “competitiveness” of struggling Japanese companies. Finally, Mr Abe is expected to put pressure on the Bank of Japan to start DIRECTLY monetising Japanese sovereign debt. He has gone so far as to suggest that the 1998 law which ostensibly granted the BoJ independence from government be rewritten or simply scrapped.

If there is any political prescription which can finally push Japan over the brink and bring on a dreaded spike in Japanese interest rates, it is the one being pushed by Mr Abe. Any increase at all in the borrowing rates being paid by the Japanese government would be instantly catastrophic. When, not if, that happens in Japan, it will be the end of the line for all those advocating stimulus via the printing press all over the world. If Mr Abe follows through on his policies after December 16, it’s only a matter of time.
Buckler is spot on, however the Japanese people are hardly aware of these nuances, and hardly aware that any ongoing blow out in bond spreads as Abe's targeted inflation goal of 3% is hit, will achieve two things before any vaunted "recovery" in the economy comes:
i) all Japanese banks and insurance companies will go promptly bust and require a massive bailout, but by Japanese citizens (most likely to be footed once again by the Chairman in exchange for the recent Japanese favor in buying US TSYs, in a time when China has decided to boycott any such purchases), and
ii) all Japanese tax revenues will go merely toward covering the cash interest on the government debt, as the following two charts summarize quite well:
Sovereign debt/government revenue. Japan is at, oh..... 2000%. Can you say living on the edge?

Total Japanese debt, which at last check was breathing on JPY 1 quadrillion:

And once the Japanese domino falls, and Kyle Bass is finally vindicated, the entire house of Keynesian cards will promptly follow.
Congratulations Japan: you may have just been the first to push the grand reset button.
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The Lost Decade (Japan)

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The Lost Decade or the Lost 10 Years (失われた10年 Ushinawareta Jūnen?) is the time after the Japanese asset price bubble's collapse within the Japanese economy, which occurred gradually rather than catastrophically. The term originally referred to the years 1991 to 2000,[1] but recently the decade from 2001 to 2010 is also sometimes included,[2] so that the whole period of the 1990s and 2000s is referred to as the Lost Two Decades or the Lost 20 Years (失われた20年, Ushinawareta Nijūnen).

Contents

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[edit] History

The strong economic growth of the 1980s ended abruptly at the start of the 1990s. In the late 1980s, abnormalities within the Japanese economic system had fueled a speculative asset price bubble of massive scale by Japanese companies, banks and securities companies. The combination of exceptionally high land values and low interest rates briefly resulted in heightened liquidity in the market. It led to massive borrowing and heavy investment mostly in domestic and foreign stocks and securities.
Recognizing that this bubble was unsustainable, the Finance Ministry sharply raised interest rates in late 1989. This sharp policy caused the bursting of the bubble, and the stock market crashed. A debt crisis followed and the Japanese banks and insurances were now loaded with bad debts. The financial institutions were bailed out through capital infusions from the government, loans from the central bank and the ability to postpone the recognition of losses, ultimately turning them into zombie banks. Yalman Onaranof of Salon stated that the zombie banks were one of the reasons for the following stagnation.[3] Additionally Michael Schuman of Time magazine noted that these banks kept injecting new funds into unprofitable "zombie firms" to keep them afloat, arguing that they were too big to fail. However, most of these companies were too debt-ridden to do much more than survive on bail-out funds. Schuman believed that Japan's economy did not begin to recover until this practice had ended.[4]
Eventually, many of these failing firms became unsustainable, and a wave of consolidation took place, resulting in four national banks in Japan. Many Japanese firms were burdened with heavy debts, and it became very difficult to obtain credit. Many borrowers turned to sarakin (loan sharks) for loans. (Even now in 2012, the official interest rate is 0.1%;[5] it has been similarly low for several years.)
The 1990s therefore was the "lost decade" when the economy contracted or grew at a paltry rate. The impact on everyday life was muted, however. Unemployment rates were high, but not at a crisis level. With the traditional Japanese emphasis on frugality and saving, an impact on an average Japanese family was quite limited, whose standard of living did not deteriorate significantly from what it was in the 1980s.[citation needed]
Despite the economic recovery in the 2000s, conspicuous consumption of the 1980s such as lavish spending on whiskey and cars did not return for the most part.[6] Difficult times in the 1990s made people frown on ostentatious display of wealth, while Japanese firms such as Toyota and Sony which had dominated the industry in the 1980s had to fend off strong competition from rival firms based in South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries. Many Japanese companies replaced a large part of their workforce with temporary workers, who had little job security and fewer benefits. As of 2009, these non-traditional employees made up more than a third of the labor force.[7] As of August 2012, the nation's economy has not fully recovered from the 1991 crash.[2]

[edit] Interpretations

Economist Paul Krugman has argued that Japan's lost decade is an example of a liquidity trap (a situation where consumers and firms saved too much overall, thereby causing the economy to slow). He explained how truly massive the asset bubble was in Japan by 1990, with a tripling of land and stock market prices during the prosperous 1980s. Japan's high personal savings rates, driven in part by the demographics of an aging population, enabled Japanese firms to rely heavily on traditional bank loans from supporting banking networks, as opposed to issuing stock or bonds via the capital markets to acquire funds. The cozy relationship of corporations to banks and the implicit guarantee of a taxpayer bailout of bank deposits created a significant moral hazard problem, leading to an atmosphere of crony capitalism and reduced lending standards. He wrote: "Japan's banks lent more, with less regard for quality of the borrower, than anyone else's. In so doing they helped inflate the bubble economy to grotesque proportions." The Bank of Japan began increasing interest rates in 1990 due in part to concerns over the bubble and in 1991 land and stock prices began a steep decline, within a few years reaching 60% below their peak.[8]
In response to the recession, Japanese policymakers tried a series of government economic stimulus programs and bank bailouts. A 2.4% budget surplus in 1991 turned to a deficit of 4.3% by 1996 and 10% by 1998, with the national debt to GDP ratio reaching 100%. In 1998, a $500 billion bank rescue plan was implemented to encourage bank lending and borrowing. The central bank also attempted to increase inflation (which devalues savings over time but can also make debts easier to pay off), to encourage consumer spending. Krugman wrote that by 2003, the Japanese economy began to recover, helped by imports from the U.S. and China that helped Japan achieve a real growth rate of 2%. He wrote the recovery was "provisional" and there was significant risk of a return to a liquidity trap.[8]
Economist Richard Koo wrote that Japan's "Great Recession" that began in 1990 was a "balance sheet recession". It was triggered by a collapse in land and stock prices, which caused Japanese firms to become insolvent, meaning their assets were worth less than their liabilities. Despite zero interest rates and expansion of the money supply to encourage borrowing, Japanese corporations in aggregate opted to pay down their debts from their own business earnings rather than borrow to invest as firms typically do. Corporate investment, a key demand component of GDP, fell enormously (22% of GDP) between 1990 and its peak decline in 2003. Japanese firms overall became net savers after 1998, as opposed to borrowers. Koo argues that it was massive fiscal stimulus (borrowing and spending by the government) that offset this decline and enabled Japan to maintain its level of GDP. In his view, this avoided a U.S. type Great Depression, in which U.S. GDP fell by 46%. He argued that monetary policy was ineffective because there was limited demand for funds while firms paid down their liabilities. In a balance sheet recession, GDP declines by the amount of debt repayment and un-borrowed individual savings, leaving government stimulus spending as the primary remedy.[9][10]
Economist Scott Sumner has argued that Japan's monetary policy was too tight during the Lost Decade.[11][12][13][14]

[edit] Legacy

On February 9, 2009, in warning of the dire consequences facing the United States economy after its housing bubble, U.S. President Barack Obama cited the "lost decade" as a prospect the American economy faced.[15] In 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard warned that the United States was in danger of becoming "enmeshed in a Japanese-style deflationary outcome within the next several years."[16]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Prescott1/Postscript_2003/hayashi-prescott.pdf
  2. ^ a b Leika Kihara (August 17, 2012). "Japan eyes end to decades long deflation". Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/17/japan-economy-estimate-idUSL4E8JH1TC20120817. Retrieved September 7, 2012.
  3. ^ Onaranof, Yalman (2011-11-25). "Kill the zombie banks!". Salon Media Groupn. http://www.salon.com/2011/11/25/kill_the_zombie_banks/. Retrieved 2013-01-16.
  4. ^ Schuman, Michael (2008-12-19). "Why Detroit Is Not Too Big to Fail". Time Inc.. http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1867847,00.html. Retrieved 2008-12-23.
  5. ^ Ohno, Kenichi. "Economic Development of Japan". National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. http://www.grips.ac.jp/teacher/oono/hp/lecture_J/lec13.htm. Retrieved 3 April 2011.
  6. ^ New York Times
  7. ^ Tabuchi, Hiroko (2009-02-22). "When Consumers Cut Back: An Object Lesson From Japan". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/business/worldbusiness/22japan.html?fta=y. Retrieved 2010-05-11.
  8. ^ a b Krugman, Paul (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. W.W. Norton Company Limited. ISBN 978-0-393-07101-6.
  9. ^ Koo, Richard (2009). The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics-Lessons from Japan's Great Recession. John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd.. ISBN 978-0-470-82494-8.
  10. ^ Presentation by Richard Koo-The Age of Balance Sheet Recessions-April 2010
  11. ^ Sumner, Scott. "Why Japan's QE didn't "work"". The Money Illusion. http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=9404. Retrieved 6/3/2011.
  12. ^ Sumner, Scott. "More evidence that the BOJ is not trying to create inflation". The Money Illusion. http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=8091. Retrieved 6/3/2011.
  13. ^ Sumner, Scott. "Rooseveltian Resolve". The Money Illusion. http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=3587.
  14. ^ Sumner, Scott. "The other money illusion". The Money Illusion. http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=6937. Retrieved 6/3/2011.
  15. ^ Meckler, Laura; Weisman, Jonathan (2009-02-10). "Obama Warns of 'Lost Decade'". The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123419281562063867.html?mod=djemalertNEWS.
  16. ^ The Seven Faces of 'The Peril'"
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Tuesday, 18 December 2012

Richard Werner

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Richard Andreas Werner (January 5, 1967-  )[1] is a German academic, economist and professor at the University of Southampton.
Werner is a monetary and development economist. He proposed the term quantitative easing, as well as the expression "QE2" referring to the need to implement true quantitative easing as an expansion in credit creation.[2]

Contents

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[edit] Early life

In 1989, Werner earned a BSc at the London School of Economics (LSE). Further studies at Oxford University were interrupted by a year at the University of Tokyo.[3] His doctorate in economics was conferred by Oxford.[1]
In 1991, he became European Commission-sponsored Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute for Economics and Statistics at Oxford.[3] His discussion paper at the institute warned about the imminent 'collapse' of the Japanese banking system and the threat of the "greatest recession since the Great Depression".
In Toyko, he also became the first Shimomura Fellow at the Research Institute for Capital Formation at the Development Bank of Japan. He was a Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies at the Bank of Japan; and he was a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Monetary and Fiscal Studies at the Ministry of Finance.[3]

[edit] Career

Werner was chief economist of Jardine Fleming from 1994 to 1998 and has published many articles on the Japanese credit cycle and monetary policy, many of which are in Japanese.
In 1997, Richard joined the faculty of Sophia University in Tokyo.[3]
Werner is currently teaching at the University of Southampton.[3] He has developed a heterodox theory of money creation called the Quantity Theory of Credit.[4]
He is the founding director of the university's Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development and organiser of the European Conference on Banking and the Economy (ECOBATE), first held on 29 September 2011 in Winchester Guildhall, with Lord Adair Turner, FSA Chairman, as keynote speaker. Since 2011, Werner has been a member of the ECB Shadow Council.
Werner's book Princes of the Yen was a number one general bestseller in Japan in 2001 [5] The book covers the monetary policy of the Bank of Japan specifically and central bank informal guidance of bank credit in general.[6]
Richard Werner proposed a policy he called "quantitative easing" in Japan in 1994 and 1995. At the time working as chief economist of Jardine Fleming Securities (Asia) Ltd. in Tokyo, he used this expression during presentations to institutional investors in Tokyo. It is also, among others, in the title of an article he published on September 2, 1995, in the Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei).[7] According to Werner, he used this phrase in order to propose a new form of monetary stimulation policy by the central bank that relied neither on interest rate reductions (which Werner claimed in his Nikkei article would be ineffective) nor on the conventional monetarist policy prescription of expanding the money supply (e.g. through "printing money", expanding high powered money, expanding bank reserves or boosting deposit aggregates such as M2 —all of which Werner also claimed would be ineffective).[8] Instead, Werner argued, it was necessary and sufficient for an economic recovery to boost "credit creation", through a number of measures.[7] He also suggested direct purchases of non-performing assets from the banks by the central bank; direct lending to companies and the government by the central bank; purchases of commercial paper, other debt, and equity instruments from companies by the central bank; and stopping the issuance of government bonds to fund the public sector borrowing requirement, instead having the government borrow directly from banks through a standard loan contract.[9][10]

[edit] Selected works

In a statistical overview derived from writings by and about Richard Andreas Werner, OCLC/WorldCat encompasses roughly 7 works in 10+ publications in 2 languages and 500+ library holdings .[11]
This is an incomplete list, which may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by expanding it with reliably sourced entries.
Books
  • Where Does Money Come From? with Josh Ryan-Collins, Tony Greenham and Andrew Jackson,London: new economics foundation (2011)
  • Neue Wirtschaftspolitik, München: Vahlen Verlag (2007)
  • New Paradigm in Macroeconomics: Solving the Riddle of Japanese Macroeconomic Performance (2005)
  • Princes of the Yen: Japan's central bankers and the transformation of the economy (2001)
  • 『謎解き!平成大不況 : 誰も語らなかった「危機」の本質』 = The enigma of the great recession (2003)
  • Three essays on Japanese macroeconomic policy in the 1980s and 1990s (2006)
  • 『福井日銀・危険な素顔』 =　The Bank of Japan under Toshihiko Fukui, with M. Ishii. Tokyo: Appuru Shuppan. (2003)
  • 『不景気が終わらない本当の理由』 =　Central Banking and Structural Changes in Japan and Europe. Tokyo: Soshisha. (2003)
  • Dismantaling the Japanese Model, with M. Kikkawa. Tokyo: Kodansha. (2003)
  • Princes of the Yen, Japan's Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
  • 『円の支配者』. Tokyo: Soshisha (2001)
Chapters
  • 1998 — "Bank of Japan window guidance and the creation of the bubble," in: Rodao, F. and A. Lopez Santos (eds.), El Japon Contemporaneo, Salamanca: University of Salamanca Press
  • 2002 — "Macroeconomic Management in Thailand: The Policy-induced Crisis," in: Rhee, G.S. (eds.), Rising to the Challenge in Aisa: A Study of Financial Markets, Vol. II, Thailand, Manila: Asian Development Bank
  • 2006 — "The relationship between interest rates and economic activity: How the conventional literature has dealt with the Japanese experience," in: Batten, J.A., Fetherston, T.A. and Szilagyi, P.G. (eds.), Japanese Fixed Income Markets: Money, Bond and Interest Rate Derivatives, Amsterdam: Elsevier (pp. 135–170)
  • 2007 — "Europe’s choice and lessons from Japan: supply vs. demand policy, fiscal vs. monetary policy," in: Terzi, A. and J. Bibow (eds.), Euroland and the World Economy: Global Player or Global Drag, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
  • 2007 — "The cause of Japan’s recession and the lessons for the world," in: Bailey, Coffey and Tomlinson (eds), Crisis or Recovery: Industry and State in Japan. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
  • 2008 — "Was sind die Voraussetzungen fuer ein gesundes Wirtschaftswachstum ohne Bankenprobleme?," in: Carl Spaengler KAG (ed.), 20 Fragen zur Geldanlage. Salzburg: Carl Spaengler Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH.
Journals
  • 1994 — "Japanese Foreign Investment and the 'Land Bubble’," Review of International Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 2, June 1994, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 166-178
  • 1997 — "Towards a New Monetary Paradigm: A Quantity Theorem of Disaggregated Credit, with Evidence from Japan," Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30, No. 2, July 1997, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 276–309.
  • 2002 — "Monetary Policy Implementation in Japan: What They Say vs. What they Do," Asian Economic Journal, Vol. 16, No.2, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 111–151.
  • 2003 — "Post-Crisis Banking Sector Restructuring and its Impact on Economic Growth," The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 4, New York: M. E. Sharpe
  • 2003 — "Aspects of Career Development and Information Management Policies at the Bank of Japan – a Frank Interview with a Former Central Banker," The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 4, New York: M. E. Sharpe.
  • 2003 — "A Reconsideration of the Rationale for Bank-Centred Economic Systems and the Effectiveness of Directed Credit Policies in the Light of Japanese Evidence," The Japanese Economy, vol. 30, no. 3, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 3–45
  • 2004 — "No Recovery without Reform? An Empirical Evaluation of the Structural Reform Argument in Japan," Asian Business and Management, vol. 3, no. 1, 2004, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • 2009 — "Financial Crises in Japan during the 20th Century". Bankhistorisches Archiv, Beiheft 47, pp. 98–123
  • 2011 — "Credit Supply and Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from Japan", International Review of Financial Analysis, 20, pp. 320–334, DOI information: 10.1016/j.irfa.2011.05.002, with Kostas Voutsinas
  • 2011 — "The Role of Monetary Aggregates in Chinese Monetary Policy Implementation", Journal of the Asia-Pacific Economy, 16, 3, pp. 464–488, with Yuanquan Chen
  • 2011 — "Economics as if Banks Mattered – A Contribution Based on the Inductive Methodology", Manchester School, vol. 79, September, pp. 25–35. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02265_5.x
Papers
  • 1991 — "The Great Yen Illusion: Japanese Capital Flows and the Role of Land," Oxford Applied Economics Discussion Paper Series, Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, No. 129, December
  • 1993 — "Towards a quantity theorem of disaggregated credit and international capital flows," Paper presented at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, York, April 1993
  • 2010 — Comment on Range of Methodologies for Risk and Performance Alignment of Remuneration [in the banking sector], official submission to public call for comments on ‘Range of Methodologies for Risk and Performance Alignment of Remuneration, Consultative Document’ by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 14 October 2010, submitted 31 December 2010.[12]
  • 2010 — Towards Stable and Competitive Banking in the UK - Evidence for the ICB, submitted to the Independent Commission on Banking, UK (Chair: Professor Sir John Vickers), submitted 19 November 2010[13]
  • 2010 — Towards a Twenty-First Century Banking and Monetary System, Joint Submission to the Independent Commission on Banking, UK (Chair: Professor Sir John Vickers), with Ben Dyson, Tony Greenham, Josh Ryan-Collins, by the Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development, the new economics foundation, and Positive Money, submitted 19 November 2010[14]
  • 2010 — Comment on Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, official submission to public call for comments on ‘Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, Consultative Document’ by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, September 2009.[15] Submitted 16 April 2010; published by the Bank for International Settlements, Basel.[16]

[edit] Honours

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b Library of Congress (LOC), Richard Andreas Werner
  2. ^ Richard Werner, "Keizai Kyoshitsu: Keiki kaifuku, ryoteiki kinyu kanwa kara," Nikkei, 2 September 1995. ‘QE2’ was first used publicly by Richard Werner live on CNBC on 22 September 2009. He argued that 'true quantitative easing' was needed, namely an expansion in productive credit creation. This required a second attempt by central banks, "a kind of QE2". Squawkbox, CNBC, live studio panel, 18:00-21:00 hrs London time, 22 September 2009Meanwhile, the expression is today mainly used to refer to a second round of what Prof. Werner would consider the 'wrong type' of QE.
  3. ^ a b c d e University of Southampton, Richard Werner; retrieved 2011-08-20
  4. ^ Richard A. Werner (1992), ‘Towards a quantity theory of disaggregated credit and international capital flows’, Paper presented at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, York, April 1993 and at the 5th Annual PACAP Conference on Pacific-Asian Capital Markets in Kuala Lumpur, June 1993
  5. ^ Yamagawa, Hiroshi. "BOJ planned bubble, decade of misery," The Japan Times, 27 July 2001; retrieved 2011-08-20
  6. ^ "Book exposes BOJ 'rulers'," Asahi Shimbun. May 10, 2001; retrieved 2011-08-20
  7. ^ a b Richard Werner, Keizai Kyoshitsu: Keiki kaifuku, ryoteiki kinyu kanwa kara, Nikkei, 2 September 1995.
  8. ^ Nikkei 2 Sept. 1995, op. cit; see also Lyonnet and Werner (2012), Lessons from QE and other ‘unconventional’ monetary policies – Evidence from the Bank of England, Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development Discussion Paper, University of Southampton
  9. ^ Richard Werner, Keizai Kyoshitsu: Keiki kaifuku, ryoteiki kinyu kanwa kara, Nikkei, 2 September 1995. But also other publications, e.g. Japanese Economist, 14 July 1998 [1]; Financial Times, 9 February 2000 [2]
  10. ^ Richard A. Werner, New Paradigm in Macroeconomics: Solving the Riddle of Japanese Macroeconomic Performance, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
  11. ^ WorldCat Identities: Werner, Richard 1967-  
  12. ^ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs178/richardwerner.pdf
  13. ^ http://www.management.soton.ac.uk/research/Towards-Stable-Banking-2010.pdf
  14. ^ http://www.neweconomics.org/sites/neweconomics.org/files/Submission-ICB-Positive-Money-nef-Soton-Uni.pdf; http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs178/richardwerner.pdf
  15. ^ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.htm
  16. ^ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/universityofsou.pdf
  17. ^ Press Release: "The World Economic Forum Designated 100 New Global Leaders for Tomorrow: Richard A Werner Selected for Class of 2003"; retrieved 2011-08-20
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