Showing posts with label united states. Show all posts
Showing posts with label united states. Show all posts

Tuesday, 7 May 2013

Centralized Planning in the United States

 

Discussions of centralized planning in the West often take it for granted that the Soviet Union and similar social systems are the only ones with centralized planning. This is a basic (albeit ideological) confusion that results from the belief that markets and centralized planning are incompatible. This is not the case.
In fact, markets are a great tool for planning in that they provide easy access to all sorts of inputs required for implementing a plan. David Graeber makes a good case in Debt: The First 5000 Years that markets generated by money taxation were crucial to implementing the states plans for large scale, long wars.
It is true that the interests between individual firms conflict on some issues, but there are general areas where they agree and share an interest in implementing a common plan. Mortgage companies may have fought over market shares in the early 2000s, but they all had an incentive to invest in preventing adequate regulation and the imposing of minimum requirements for credit assessments.
The difference between this type of competition and competition among different factions of the Politburo has been greatly exaggerated.
New York City is an excellent example of this. As the late Robert Fitch lays out in his essay “Planning New York”, FIRE began organizing around reorganizing New York in its own interest in the early 20th century (the entire essay, as well as the collection, is excellent and copies are relatively cheap). They eventually organized themselves into the Regional Planning Association, which still exists and still puts out recommendations to this day.
What did they want? The elimination of industry in Manhattan and generally rising land values and rents. As we’ve seen in the past decade, the prosperity of the FIRE sector is crucially dependent on continuous growth in debt (especially mortgage debt) and large rises in land prices and rents. This isn’t an accidental process.
The largest industry in New York City in the mid 19th century to early 20th century was the garment workers’ industry. As of 1929, 3/4 of ladies’ garments manufactured in the United States were manufactured in New York City (Fitch 1977, pg 262). These small manufacturers were located as close as possible to the clothing shops they supplied. As Fitch describes it:
This led to a problem seemingly more characteristic of Hindu than American society: the indignity high-caste customers had to suffer by coming in close contact with large numbers of garment workers, many of them Jewish. (ibid, pg 256)
This industry’s location was crowding the subways, taking away customers and, most disturbingly of all (from the FIRE perspective), redirecting land away from the uses most profitable to FIRE while preventing rises in land values.
The solution was planning the garment industry out of existence through rezoning Manhattan, freezing manufacturers were they are and putting more onerous restrictions on the firm’s use of their lofts. A quick trip to the lower west side (where I grew up and live) will tell you that they succeeded. Yet this process is almost completely ignored in mainstream conversations about the history of American manufacturing. As Fitch says:
…what makes this neglect so striking is that the plan has been largely realized in actual physical terms. The proposed highway system, designed like sculptor’s armature to serve as infrastructural support for the desired suburbanization and decentralization of the region- this system, complete with tunnels, bridges, grade separations, was imposed on the region in almost precisely the form specified by the planners. And the same can be said, to a lesser extent, of the post-1929 development of the park system. (the proponents of the Robert Moses Theory of History notwithstanding). (ibid, 246)
Interestingly, Robert Moses was not among the Robert Moses Theory of History proponents:
The finance is a tremendously important phase of the whole thing. My experience has been that many of the people, by no means all, who call themselves planners are people who make pretty pictures;They draw things; They present a plausible and often dramatic, melodramatic program, but they’re not people who get anything done.
Seen from this perspective, globalization emerges not so much as the natural progression of market forces but as a logical response from corporations being deliberately squeezed out geographically and politically by regional FIRE sectors.
When they lose more and more access to the capital budgets of local, state and federal governments it becomes cheaper to buy access to the capital budgets and geography of developing countries with smaller, weaker capitalists of all stripes. Indeed many of these countries were and are still interested in industrial planning even where the US has largely abandoned it.
Additionally, it’s much easier to get support for free trade policies that facilitate outsourcing since the FIRE sector often has interests in free trade (mostly because copyright, patent and financial sector agreements are part and parcel with free trade agreements). “Cheap labor” is simply an added perk. As Michael Hudson has so forcefully argued, industry could have cheapened labor domestically by shifting the burden of taxation from wages to land and financial wealth, but that would involve fighting the FIRE sector in ways that they simply aren’t capable of doing (not to mention industry’s increasing integration with the FIRE sector).
Joan Robinson famously said “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all”. A similar dictum applies to Planning. The misery created by having your society planned by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not having it planned at all. It isn’t recognized as such, but the best example of this principle is Flint, Michigan. Its a city that, for all it’s problems, was heavily planned. Robert Moses again provides a lot of insight – some of it unintentional – into this issue in an interview with the NBC Wisdom series in 1959:
The interesting thing about flint is… it’s a city that has leadership. It’s largely industrial leadership. it’s a General Motors town, primarily a Chevrolet town with some Buick overtones. And the president of General Motors, the last recent president, lived there….some of them [wealthy elites] have survived 50 years. Mr. Martin, for example, is, as I recall it, the largest single stockholder in General Motors. He’s 83 or 84 years old and still as lively as a cricket. And he’s interested in the civic center, He’s interested in having a cultural center, having a branch of Michigan university,an opera house, running track, a philharmonic, and all the other things that you can think of. And they have provided real leadership in that town. And when that group of top industrialists and the labor leaders get together they decide what will be done and it is done. I don’t say there’s been a complete lack of political leadership, but it has been a town that has acknowledged leaders and they get together to decide to do something and they do it.
If you’ve ever seen Michael Moore’s Roger & Me, you know how this story ends. The industrial elites became increasingly financialized and detached from the urban areas in which their industries were based. As that happened, they moved away, personally and economically.
Without local elites interested in the local area and with weak local politicians. places like Flint have deteriorated remarkably. Those left behind have at best had small visions that futilely attempted to recapture yesteryear.
If you’re interested in knowing what market forces unshaped by conscious planning look like, I’d recommend you go to Flint.
Follow me on Twitter at @NathanTankus 
Originally appeared on Naked Capitalism

Wednesday, 20 March 2013

United States Notes, and the Greenbacks

 
 
It is claimed that Abraham Lincoln issued Greenbacks which were United State Notes that largely financed the success of the American Civil War rather than relying on borrowing from banks, and similiar sources . RS
 
 
 
 
 
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Jump to: navigation, search


Large-sized Series of 1880 United States Notes; the $20 note displays Alexander Hamilton and a red scalloped seal, and the $10 Daniel Webster and a large red spiked seal
A United States Note, also known as a Legal Tender Note, is a type of paper money that was issued from 1862 to 1971 in the U.S. Having been current for over 100 years, they were issued for longer than any other form of U.S. paper money. They were known popularly as "greenbacks" in their heyday, a name inherited from the Demand Notes that they replaced in 1862. Often called Legal Tender Notes, they were called United States Notes by the First Legal Tender Act, which authorized them as a form of fiat currency. During the 1860s the so-called second obligation on the reverse of the notes stated:[1]
This Note is Legal Tender for All Debts Public and Private Except Duties On Imports And Interest On The Public Debt; And Is Redeemable In Payment Of All Loans Made To The United States.
They were originally issued directly into circulation by the U.S. Treasury to pay expenses incurred by the Union during the American Civil War. Over the next century, the legislation governing these notes was modified many times and numerous versions have been issued by the Treasury.
United States Notes that were issued in the large-size format, before 1929, differ dramatically in appearance when compared to modern American currency, but those issued in the small-size format, starting in 1929, are very similar to contemporary Federal Reserve Notes with the highly visible distinction of having red U.S. Treasury Seals and serial numbers in place of green ones.
Existing United States Notes remain valid currency in the United States. However, since no United States Notes have been issued since January 1971, they are vanishingly rare in circulation.

Contents

 [hide

[edit] History

[edit] Demand Notes


Comparison of a $5 Demand Note (upper image) and an 1862 issue $5 United States Note (lower image). Note the removal of the words "On Demand" and of the phrase "Receivable in Payment of All Public Dues". Also note the Treasury Seal added to the United States Note.
During 1861, the opening year of the American Civil War, the expenses incurred by the Union Government far outstripped its limited revenues from taxation, and borrowing was the main vehicle for financing the war. The Act of July 17, 1861[2] authorized Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to raise money via the issuance of $50,000,000 in Treasury Notes payable on demand.[3] These Demand Notes were paid out to creditors directly and used to meet the payroll of soldiers in the field. While issued within the legal framework of Treasury Note Debt, the Demand Notes were intended to circulate as currency and were of the same size as and, in appearance, closely resembled banknotes.[4] In December 1861, economic conditions deteriorated and a suspension of specie payment led the government to cease redeeming the Demand Notes in coin.

[edit] The Legal Tender Acts

The beginning of 1862 found the Union's expenses mounting, and the government was having trouble funding the escalating war. U.S. Demand Notes—which were used, among other things, to pay Union soldiers—were unredeemable, and the value of the notes began to deteriorate. On January 16, 1862, in a private meeting with President Lincoln, Edmund Dick Taylor advised him to issue greenbacks as legal tender.[5][6] Congressman and Buffalo banker Elbridge G. Spaulding prepared a bill, based on the Free Banking Law of New York, that eventually became the National Banking Act of 1863.[7] Recognizing, however, that his proposal would take many months to pass Congress, in early February Spaulding introduced another bill to permit the U.S. Treasury to issue $150 million in notes as legal tender.[8] This caused tremendous controversy in Congress, as hitherto the Constitution had been interpreted as not granting the government the power to issue a paper currency. "The bill before us is a war measure, a measure of necessity, and not of choice," Spaulding argued before the House, adding, "These are extraordinary times, and extraordinary measures must be resorted to in order to save our Government, and preserve our nationality." Spaulding justified the action as a "necessary means of carrying into execution the powers granted in the Constitution 'to raise and support armies,' and 'to provide and maintain a navy.'”[9] Despite strong opposition, President Lincoln signed the First Legal Tender Act,[10] enacted February 25, 1862, into law, authorizing the issuance of United States Notes as a legal tender—the paper currency soon to be known as "greenbacks".
Initially, the emission was limited to $150,000,000 total face value between the new Legal Tender Notes and the existing Demand Notes. The Act also called for the new notes to be used to replace the Demand Notes as soon as practical. The Demand Notes had been issued in denominations of $5, $10, and $20, and these were replaced by United States Notes nearly identical in appearance on the obverse. In addition, notes of entirely new design were introduced in denominations of $50, $100, $500 and $1000. The Demand Notes' printed promise of payment "On Demand" was removed and the statement "This Note is a Legal Tender" was added.

A political cartoon from the 1864 election depicting Secretary Fessenden of the Lincoln administration running "Chase's Mill" at left to flood the country with Greenbacks
Legal tender status guaranteed that creditors would have to accept the notes despite the fact that they were not backed by gold, bank deposits, or government reserves, and bore no interest. However, the First Legal Tender Act did not make the notes an unlimited legal tender as they could not be used by merchants to pay customs duties on imports and could not be used by the government to pay interest on its bonds. The Act did provide that the notes be receivable by the government for short term deposits at 5% interest, and for the purchase of 6% interest 20-year bonds at par. The rationale for these terms was that the Union government would preserve its credit-worthiness by supporting the value of its bonds by paying their interest in gold. Early in the war, customs duties were a large part of government tax revenue and by making these payable in gold, the government would generate the coin necessary to make the interest payments on the bonds. Lastly, by making the bonds available for purchase at par in United States Notes, the value of the latter would be supported as well.[3] The limitations to the legal tender status were quite controversial. Thaddeus Stevens, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee of Ways and Means, which had authored an earlier version of the Legal Tender Act that would have made United States Notes a legal tender for all debts, denounced the exceptions, calling the new bill "mischievous" because it made United States Notes an intentionally depreciated currency for the masses, while the banks who loaned to the government got "sound money" in gold. This controversy would continue until the removal of the exceptions in 1933.
In the First Legal Tender Act, Congress limited the Treasury's emission of United States Notes to $150,000,000; however, by 1863, the Second Legal Tender Act,[11] enacted July 11, 1862, a Joint Resolution of Congress,[12] and the Third Legal Tender Act,[13] enacted March 3, 1863, had expanded the limit to $450,000,000, the option to exchange the notes for United States bonds at par had been revoked, and notes of $1 and $2 denominations had been introduced as the appearance of fiat currency had driven even silver coinage out of circulation. As a result of this inflation, the greenback went on to trade at a substantial discount from gold, which prompted Congress to pass the short-lived Anti-gold futures act of 1864, which was soon repealed after it seemed to accelerate the decline of the greenback.
The largest amount of greenbacks outstanding at any one time was calculated as $447,300,203.10.[14] The Union's reliance on expanding the circulation of greenbacks eventually ended with the emission of Interest Bearing and Compound Interest Treasury Notes, and the passage of the National Banking Act. However, the end of the war found the greenbacks trading for only roughly half of their nominal value in gold.[3]

[edit] Post Civil War

At the end of the Civil War, some economists, such as Henry Charles Carey, argued for building on the precedent of non-debt-based fiat money and making the greenback system permanent.[15] However, Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch argued that the Legal Tender Acts had been war measures, and that the United States should soon reverse them and return to the gold standard. The House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to endorse the Secretary's view.[16] With an eventual return to gold convertibility in mind, the Funding Act of April 12, 1866[17] was passed, authorizing McCulloch to retire $10 million of the Greenbacks within six months and up to $4 million per month thereafter. This he proceeded to do until only $356,000,000 were outstanding in February 1868. By this point, the wartime economic boom was over, the crop harvest was poor, and a panic in Great Britain caused a recession and a sharp drop in prices in the United States.[18] The contraction of the money supply was blamed for the deflationary effects, and led debtors to successfully agitate for a halt to the notes' retirement.[19]
In the early 1870s, Treasury Secretaries George S. Boutwell and William Adams Richardson maintained that, though Congress had mandated $356,000,000 as the minimum Greenback circulation, the old Civil War statutes still authorized a maximum of $400,000,000[20] - and thus they had at their discretion a "reserve" of $44,000,000. While the Senate Finance Committee under John Sherman disagreed, being of the opinion that the $356,000,000 was a maximum as well as a minimum, no legislation was passed to assert the Committee's opinion. Starting in 1872, Boutwell and Richardson used the "reserve" to counteract seasonal demands for currency, and eventually expanded the circulation of the Greenbacks to $382,000,000 in response to the Panic of 1873.[21]
In June 1874, Congress officially capped the Greenback circulation at $382,000,000, and in January 1875, passed the Specie Payment Resumption Act, which authorized a contraction in the circulation of Greenbacks towards a revised limit of $300,000,000, and required the government to redeem them for gold, on demand, after 1 January 1879. As a result, the currency strengthened and by April 1876, the notes were on par with silver coins which then began to re-emerge into circulation.[22] On May 31, 1878, the contraction in the circulation was halted at $346,681,016 - a level which would be maintained for almost 100 years afterwards.[23] While $346,681,016 was a significant figure at the time, it is now a very small fraction of the total currency in circulation in the United States. The year 1879 found Sherman, now Secretary of the Treasury, in possession of sufficient specie to redeem notes as requested, but as this brought the value of the greenbacks into parity with gold for the first time since the Specie Suspension of December 1861, the public voluntarily accepted the greenbacks as part of the circulating medium.[16]

Series of 1901 $10 Legal Tender depicting military explorers Meriwether Lewis, William Clark, and an American bison.
While the United States Notes had been used as a form of debt issuance during the Civil War, afterwards they were used as a way of moderately influencing the money supply by the federal government - such as through the actions of Boutwell and Richardson. During the Panic of 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to increase liquidity in the markets by authorizing the Treasury to issue more Greenbacks, but the Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided for the needed flexibility in the National Bank Note supply instead. Eventually, the perceived need for an elastic currency was addressed with the Federal Reserve Notes authorized by the Federal Reserve Act, and pressure to alter the circulating quantity of United States Notes subsided.
Soon after private ownership of gold was banned in 1933, all of the remaining types of circulating currency, silver certificates, Federal Reserve Notes, and United States Notes, were redeemable by individuals only for silver. Eventually, even silver redemption stopped in 1965-68, during a time in which all U.S. currency (both coins and paper currency) was changed to fiat currency. At this point for the general public, there was little to distinguish United States Notes from Federal Reserve Notes. As a result, the public circulation of United States Notes, which was then mainly in the form of $5 bills, was replaced with $5 Federal Reserve Notes, and the stock of United States Notes was mostly converted into $100 bills, which spent most of their time in bank vaults. No more United States Notes were put into circulation after January 21, 1971.[24] In September 1994 the Riegle Improvement Act released the Treasury from its long-standing obligation to keep the notes in circulation and finally, in 1996, the Treasury announced that its stock of $100 United States Notes had been destroyed.[25]

[edit] Comparison to Federal Reserve Notes

The United States Note was a national currency whereas Federal Reserve Notes are issued by the quasi-federal Federal Reserve System.[26] Both have been legal tender since the gold recall of 1933. Both have been used in circulation as money in the same way. However, the issuing authority for them came from different statutes.[24] United States Notes were created as fiat currency, in that the government has never categorically guaranteed to redeem them for precious metal - even though at times, such as after the specie resumption of 1879, federal officials were authorized to do so if requested. The difference between a United States Note and a Federal Reserve Note is that a United States Note represented a "bill of credit" and was inserted by the Treasury directly into circulation free of interest. Federal Reserve Notes are backed by debt purchased by the Federal Reserve, and thus generate seigniorage, or interest, for the Federal Reserve System, which serves as a lending parent to the Treasury and the public.
As the debt purchased by the Federal Reserve System to back its notes consists primarily of Treasury and Government-sponsored enterprise debt,[27] and because the seigniorage is largely remitted back to the Treasury as "interest on Federal Reserve Notes", the economics to the Treasury are comparable to issuing United States Notes. This stands in contrast to National Bank Notes which allowed the issuing banks to privately retain the seigniorage as profit.

[edit] Characteristics


The first small size $1 United States Note issued (Smithsonian Institution).

The first small size $2 United States Note issued (Smithsonian Institution).

The first small size $5 United States Note issued (Smithsonian Institution).
Like all U.S. currency, United States Notes were produced in a large sized format until 1929, at which point the notes' sizes were reduced to the small-size format of the present day.
The original large-sized Civil War issues were dated 1862 and 1863, and issued in denominations of $1, $2, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $500 and $1000.[28] The United States Notes were dramatically redesigned for the Series of 1869, the so-called Rainbow Notes. The notes were again redesigned in the Series of 1874, 1875 and 1878. The Series of 1878 included, for the first and last time, notes of $5,000 and $10,000 denominations. The final across-the-board redesign of the large-sized notes was the Series of 1880. Individual denominations were redesigned in 1901, 1907, 1917 and 1923.
On small-sized United States Notes, the U.S. Treasury Seal and the serial numbers are printed in red (contrasting with Federal Reserve Notes, where they usually appear in green). By the time the small-size format was adopted, the Federal Reserve System was already in place and there was limited need for United States Notes. They were mainly issued in $2 and $5 denominations in the Series years of 1928, 1953, and 1963. There was a limited issue of $1 notes in the Series of 1928, and an issue of $100 notes in the Series year of 1966, mainly to satisfy legacy legal requirements of maintaining the mandated quantity in circulation.
Section 5119(b)(2) of Title 31, United States Code, was amended by the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-325) to read as follows: "The Secretary shall not be required to reissue United States currency notes upon redemption." This does not change the legal tender status of United States Notes nor does it require a recall of those notes already in circulation. This provision means that United States Notes are to be cancelled and destroyed but not reissued. This will eventually result in a decrease in the amount of these notes outstanding.[29]

[edit] Public Debt of the United States

As of December 2012, the U.S. Treasury calculates that $239 million in United States notes are in circulation, and excludes this amount from the statutory debt limit of the United States. This amount excludes $25 million in United States Notes issued prior to July 1, 1929, determined pursuant to Act of June 30, 1961, 31 U.S.C. 5119, to have been destroyed or irretrievably lost.[30]

[edit] Politics and controversy

The concept of replacing precious metals with fiat paper as the medium of exchange was contentious and attracted attention.
The United States Congress had enacted the Legal Tender Acts during the U.S. Civil War when southern Democrats were absent from the Congress, and thus their Jacksonian hard money views were underrepresented. After the war, the Supreme Court ruled on the Legal Tender Cases to determine the constitutionality of the use of greenbacks. The 1870 case Hepburn v. Griswold found unconstitutional the use of greenbacks when applied to debts established prior to the First Legal Tender Act as the five Democrats on the Court, Nelson, Grier, Clifford, Field, and Chase, ruled against the Civil War legislation in a 5-3 decision. Secretary Chase had become Chief Justice of the United States and a Democrat, and spearheaded the decision invalidating his own actions during the war. However, Grier retired from the Court, and President Grant appointed two new Republicans, Strong and Bradley, who joined the three sitting Republicans, Swayne, Miller, and Davis, to reverse Hepburn, 5-4, in the 1871 cases Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis. In 1884, the Court, controlled 8-1 by Republicans, granted the federal government very broad power to issue Legal Tender paper through the case Juilliard v. Greenman, with only the lone remaining Democrat, Field, dissenting.[21]
The states in the far west stayed loyal to the Union, but also had hard money sympathies. During the specie suspension from 1862 to 1878 western states used the gold dollar as a unit of account whenever possible and accepted greenbacks at a discount wherever they could.[3] The preferred forms of paper money were gold certificates and National Gold Bank Notes, the latter having been created specifically to address the desire for hard money in California.
During the 1870s and 1880s, the Greenback Party existed for the primary purpose of advocating an increased circulation of United States Notes as a way of creating inflation according to the quantity theory of money. However, as the 1870s unfolded, the market price of silver fell with respect to gold, and inflationists found a new cause in the Free Silver movement. Opposition to the resumption of specie convertibility of the Greenbacks in 1879 was accordingly muted.

[edit] See also

[edit] Footnotes

  1. ^ Friedberg, Arthur L. and Ira S., 2006, Paper Money of the United States, 18th Edition, Clifton, NJ, The Coin & Currency Institute, Inc. ISBN 0-87184-518-0
  2. ^ United States Congress. Act of July, 17 1861 Chapter Ⅴ. Washington D.C.: 1861
  3. ^ a b c d Mitchell, Wesley Clair, "A History of the Greenbacks With Special Reference To the Economic Consequences of Their Issue 1862-65", University of Chicago, Chicago, 1903.
  4. ^ Chittenden, L.E., Recollections of President Lincoln and His Administration, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1891.
  5. ^ Congressional Serial Set, Issue 2599, Volume 2. Report No. 380, U.S. G.P.O., 1888.
  6. ^ Abraham Lincoln's pen and voice, p. 404. Abraham Lincoln, George Mandeville Van Buren, 1890.
  7. ^ Heidler, D.S. & Heidler, J.T. (2000). Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: a political, social, and military history (p. 1168). New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
  8. ^ McPherson, J.M. (1988). Battle cry of freedom: the Civil War era (p.445). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  9. ^ Spaulding, E.G. (1869). History of the legal tender paper money issued during the great rebellion (p.29). Buffalo, NY: Express Printing.
  10. ^ ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345
  11. ^ ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532
  12. ^ United States Congress. Resolution of January 17, 1863, No. 9. Washington D.C.: 1863
  13. ^ ch. 73, 12 Stat. 709
  14. ^ Backus, Charles K., "The Contraction of the Currency", The Honest Money League of the Northwest, Chicago, Ill., 1878.
  15. ^ Carey, Henry Charles (March 1865) The Way to Outdo England Without Fighting Her
  16. ^ a b United States Notes, John Joseph Lalor, "Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States", Rand McNally & Co, Chicago, 1881.
  17. ^ United States Congress. Act of April 12, 1866 Chapter XXXIII. Washington D.C.: 1866
  18. ^ Studenski, Paul; Krooss, Hermand Edward (1952). Financial History of the United States, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 1-58798-175-0.
  19. ^ The Greenback Question. Retrieved May 30, 2009.
  20. ^ While the three Legal Tender Acts had authorized $450,000,000 of notes, the Second Legal Tender Act, in taking the total from $150,000,000 to $300,000,000 had reserved $50,000,000 of the increase for the purpose of redeeming balances in a temporary deposit program. The Act of June 30, 1864, reiterated this limitation, and as the temporary loan program had ceased to exist, only $400,000,000 of the $450,000,000 ceiling were available.
  21. ^ a b Timberlake, Richard H.(1993). Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-80384-5.
  22. ^ Bowers, Q. David; David Sundman (2006). 100 GREATEST AMERICAN CURRENCY NOTES, Atlanta, Georgia: Whitman Publishing. ISBN 0-7948-2006-9.
  23. ^ The National Balance Sheet; It Includes $71,000,000 of Debits Which Might Well Be Dropped New York Times May 24, 1903, Sunday
  24. ^ a b U.S. Treasury - FAQ: Legal Tender Status
  25. ^ Hessler, Gene and Chambliss, Carlson (2006). The Comprehensive Catalog of U.S. Paper Money, 7th edition, Port Clinton, Ohio: BNR Press ISBN 0-931960-66-5.
  26. ^ "President John F.Kennedy, The Federal Reserve, and Executive Order 11110". The Final Call 15 (6). January 17, 1996. http://www.john-f-kennedy.net/executiveorder11110.htm.
  27. ^ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Statements of the Federal Reserve System, Combined Federal Reserve Banks as of December 31, 2011
  28. ^ Chronology of Large-Size Notes Retrieved June 6, 2009.
  29. ^ http://www.bep.treas.gov/historicallegislation.html
  30. ^ "Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States". United States Treasury Department. 2012-12-31. http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2012/opdm122012.pdf. Retrieved 2013-01-08.

[edit] Further reading

[edit] External links




Early American Currency, the Colonial Scrip, and the Continental Notes...

 
 
 
 
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Front and back of a three pence bill of Pennsylvania currency, printed by John Dunlap in 1777.[1]
Early American currency went through several stages of development in the colonial and post-Revolutionary history of the United States. Because few coins were minted in the thirteen colonies that became the United States in 1776, foreign coins like the Spanish dollar were widely circulated. Colonial governments sometimes issued paper money to facilitate economic activity. The British Parliament passed Currency Acts in 1751, 1764, and 1773 that regulated colonial paper money.
During the American Revolution, the colonies became independent states; freed from British monetary regulations, they issued paper money to pay for military expenses. The Continental Congress also issued paper money during the Revolution, known as Continental currency, to fund the war effort. Both state and Continental currency depreciated rapidly, becoming practically worthless by the end of the war.
To address these and other problems, the United States Constitution, ratified in 1788, denied individual states the right to coin and print money. The First Bank of the United States, chartered in 1791, and the Coinage Act of 1792, began the era of a national American currency.

Contents

 [hide

[edit] Colonial currency

There were three general types of money in the colonies of British America: commodity money, specie (coins), and paper money.[2] Commodity money was used when cash (coins and paper money) was scarce. Commodities such as tobacco, beaver skins, and wampum served as money at various times and places.[3]
As in Great Britain, cash in the colonies was denominated in pounds, shillings, and pence.[3] The value varied from colony to colony; a Massachusetts pound, for example, was not equivalent to a Pennsylvania pound. All colonial pounds were of less value than the British pound sterling.[3] The coins in circulation in the colonies were most often of Spanish and Portuguese origin.[3] The prevalence of the Spanish dollar in the colonies led to the money of the United States being denominated in dollars rather than pounds.[3]
One by one, colonies began to issue their own paper money to serve as a convenient medium of exchange. In 1690, the Province of Massachusetts Bay created "the first authorized paper money issued by any government in the Western World".[4] This paper money was issued to pay for a military expedition during King William's War. Other colonies followed the example of Massachusetts Bay by issuing their own paper currency in subsequent military conflicts.[4]
The paper bills issued by the colonies were known as "bills of credit". Bills of credit were usually fiat money; that is, they could not be exchanged for a fixed amount of gold or silver coins upon demand.[3][5] Bills of credit were usually issued by colonial governments to pay debts. The governments would then retire the currency by accepting the bills for payment of taxes. When colonial governments issued too many bills of credit, or failed to tax them out of circulation, inflation resulted. This happened especially in New England and the southern colonies, which unlike the middle colonies, were frequently at war.[5]
This depreciation of colonial currency was harmful to creditors in Great Britain when colonists paid their debts with money that had lost value. Adam Smith criticized colonial bills of credit in his famed 1776 work The Wealth of Nations. According to Smith, the inflationary nature of the currency was a "violent injustice" to the creditor; "a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors" (Book II, Chapter II). As a result, the British Parliament passed several Currency Acts to regulate the paper money issued by the colonies. The Currency Act of 1751 restricted the emission of paper money in New England. It allowed the existing bills to be used as legal tender for public debts (i.e. paying taxes), but disallowed their use for private debts (e.g. for paying merchants).[6]
Another Currency Act in 1764 extended the restrictions to the colonies south of New England. Unlike the earlier act, this act did not prohibit the colonies in question from issuing paper money, but it did forbid them to designate their currency as legal tender for public or private debts. This prohibition created tension between the colonies and the mother country, and has sometimes been seen as a contributing factor in the coming of the American Revolution. After much lobbying, Parliament amended the act in 1773, permitting the colonies to issue paper currency as legal tender for public debts.[7] Shortly thereafter, some colonies once again began issuing paper money. When the American Revolutionary War began in 1775, all of the rebel colonies—soon to be independent states—issued paper money to pay for military expenses.

[edit] By colony

A twelve pence (one shilling) note in Massachusetts state currency, issued in 1776. These "codfish" bills, so-called because of the cod in the border design, were engraved by Paul Revere.[8]
Colony/statePaper money
first issued in:
Connecticut pound1709
Delaware pound1723
Georgia pound1735
Maryland pound1733
Massachusetts pound1690
New Hampshire pound1709
New Jersey pound1709
New York pound1709
North Carolina pound1712
Pennsylvania pound1723
Rhode Island pound1710
South Carolina pound1703
Virginia pound1755

[edit] Continental currency

Continental One Third Dollar Note (obverse)
A fifty-five dollar Continental issued in 1779.
After the American Revolutionary War began in 1775, the Continental Congress began issuing paper money known as Continental currency, or Continentals. Continental currency was denominated in dollars from 1/6 of a dollar to $80, including many odd denominations in between. During the Revolution, Congress issued $241,552,780 in Continental currency.[9]
Continental currency depreciated badly during the war, giving rise to the famous phrase "not worth a continental".[10] A primary problem was that monetary policy was not coordinated between Congress and the states, which continued to issue bills of credit.[11] "Some think that the rebel bills depreciated because people lost confidence in them or because they were not backed by tangible assets," writes financial historian Robert E. Wright. "Not so. There were simply too many of them."[12] Congress and the states lacked the will or the means to retire the bills from circulation through taxation or the sale of bonds.[13]
Another problem was that the British successfully waged economic warfare by counterfeiting Continentals on a large scale. Benjamin Franklin later wrote:
The artists they employed performed so well that immense quantities of these counterfeits which issued from the British government in New York, were circulated among the inhabitants of all the states, before the fraud was detected. This operated significantly in depreciating the whole mass....[14]
By the end of 1778, Continentals retained from 1/5 to 1/7 of their face value. By 1780, the bills were worth 1/40th of face value. Congress attempted to reform the currency by removing the old bills from circulation and issuing new ones, without success. By May 1781, Continentals had become so worthless that they ceased to circulate as money. Franklin noted that the depreciation of the currency had, in effect, acted as a tax to pay for the war.[15] In the 1790s, after the ratification of the United States Constitution, Continentals could be exchanged for treasury bonds at 1% of face value.[16]
After the collapse of Continental currency, Congress appointed Robert Morris to be Superintendent of Finance of the United States. Morris advocated the creation of the first financial institution chartered by the United States, the Bank of North America, in 1782. The bank was funded in part by specie loaned to the United States by France. Morris helped finance the final stages of the war by issuing notes in his name, backed by his own money. The Bank of North America also issued notes convertible into specie.[17]
The painful experience of the runaway inflation and collapse of the Continental dollar prompted[citation needed] the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to include the gold and silver clause into the United States Constitution so that the individual states could not issue bills of credit, or "make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts."[18] This restriction of bills of credit was extended to the Federal Government, as the power to "emit bills" from the Articles of Confederation was abolished, leaving Congress with the power "to borrow money on credit."[19][20]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Newman, 350.
  2. ^ Flynn, "Credit in the Colonial American Economy".
  3. ^ a b c d e f Michener, "Money in the American Colonies".
  4. ^ a b Newman, 11.
  5. ^ a b Wright, 45.
  6. ^ Allen, 96–98.
  7. ^ Allen, 98.
  8. ^ Newman, 185–86.
  9. ^ Newman, 16.
  10. ^ Newman, 17.
  11. ^ Wright, 50.
  12. ^ Wright, 49.
  13. ^ Wright, 52
  14. ^ Kenneth Scot, Counterfeiting in Colonial America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 259–60.
  15. ^ Wright, 49; Newman, 17.
  16. ^ Newman, 17; 49.
  17. ^ Wright, 62.
  18. ^ U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 10.
  19. ^ U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8.
  20. ^ Rozeff, p 18. http://mises.org/books/rozeff_us_constitution_and_money.pdf

[edit] Bibliography

[edit] Further reading

  • Brock, Leslie V. The currency of the American colonies, 1700–1764: a study in colonial finance and imperial relations. Dissertations in American economic history. New York: Arno Press, 1975. ISBN 0-405-07257-0.
  • Ernst, Joseph Albert. Money and politics in America, 1755–1775: a study in the Currency act of 1764 and the political economy of revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973. ISBN 0-8078-1217-X.

[edit] External links