Showing posts with label neoclassical. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neoclassical. Show all posts

Friday, 27 March 2015

The time for a new economics is at hand

Opinion
Eric Piermont / AFP / AlJazeera America/

 

The crises we now face illustrate the limits of neoclassical orthodoxy

March 8, 2015 3:00AM ET
In early January I passed out a leaflet to my colleagues at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in Boston, which brought together more than 11,000 economists and social scientists. The leaflet pointed out the profession’s failure to predict the 2008 financial crisis and challenged economics professors to incorporate new ideas into their teachings. As a self-proclaimed Marxist-feminist-anti-racist-ecological economist and economics professor, I was glad to take this opportunity to protest the lack of pluralism in the profession as well as the weaknesses of mainstream neoclassical economic theory, especially in the currently dominant free-market form.
The leafleting was part of an action organized by the kick-it-over campaign of Adbusters, the anti-consumerist Canadian nonprofit headed by Kalle Lasn, whose call to “occupy Wall Street” sparked the movement that swept the U.S. in the fall of 2011. Just as Occupy Wall Street aimed at exposing the failures of the financial industry, the kick-it-over campaign aims to expose the failures of the economics profession. The recent rise of Rethinking Economics and the International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, with groups in more than 20 countries, is part of this heartening trend.
One of the biggest weaknesses of U.S. economists and economics these days is the inability to think creatively. Almost all introductory economics classes taught in the United States — and core theory courses for economics majors and Ph.D. students — teach a school of economic theory that historians of economic thought call neoclassical economics (opposed to the earlier, classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx). Neoclassical economists take the capitalist market economy as a given and focus on its allocation of scarce resources among competing individuals. They build models based on assumptions of narrowly self-interested, materialistic utility maximization by consumers and profit maximization by firms. Sharing this foundation, their liberal and conservative camps disagree about the type and extent of government intervention required to respond to market failures. Neoclassical economics provides a wealth of insights into capitalist market economies. The problem is that it represents itself as economics, per se.
The important insights of other forms of economics — which tend to be more historical, critical and visionary — are thereby banished. For example, radical and Marxist economics, which focus on the class inequality and power, bring crucial warnings about economic injustice and the corruption of political power by the wealthy and large corporations as well as visions of possible superior economic systems. And feminist economics, by foregrounding gender difference and inequality, elucidates the problems resulting from the nonpayment of reproductive labor and the banishment of feminine caring values from the goals of capitalist firms. These and other heterodox specialties exist in professional associations and journals, but they are almost never mentioned, let alone represented, in core economics classes at the undergraduate or graduate level. Students who question the narrowness of neoclassical assumptions and models are told to think like an economist — i.e., a neoclassical economist — or else. This narrowness of perspective is reproduced when students who were taught only neoclassical economics become professors who teach only it. 

The rise of neoliberalism

The hegemony of neoclassical economics and the relative power of its left (interventionist) and right (free market) wings have varied with the political economic climate of the country and the world. In the U.S. by the late 1960s, popular and student activist movements for civil rights, labor, feminism and environmentalism had reconnected to and revitalized the Marxist theories that had been suppressed during the McCarthy era. Students like me were drawn to economics because of their concern with the pressing economic problems of poverty, inequality, racism, gender inequality and environmental destruction and found that heterodox theoretical frameworks — which foregrounded power, class inequality and the role of economic institutions and culture in reproducing them — were more amenable to the kind of critical analysis they were looking for.
In this way, the radical social movements of the 1960s were able to gain a foothold in the economics profession. They revived and transformed theoretical traditions more critical of capitalism than neoclassicism. They formed an active left wing of the profession and engaged in healthy dialogue and alliances with left-leaning, Keynesian neoclassical economists who were convinced of the necessity of government spending to counteract unemployment and of other forms of market interventions such as anti-poverty programs, environmental regulation and anti-trust laws. Economists played a key role in creating the climate within which President Richard Nixon proposed the Environmental Protection Agency to Congress in 1970 and President Jimmy Carter signed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act in 1978. 
With capitalism beset by multiple interconnected crises, the hegemony of neoliberalism appears to have peaked.
The 1980s saw what can only be described as a counterreaction, both in the political economy and in academia. Building on the earlier work of conservative, Chicago School economists such as Milton Friedman and funding by conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, new theories and fields expounding the ineffectiveness of government regulation rose to prominence and came to be known by heterodox economists and other outsiders as neoliberalism or free market fundamentalism. Prescribing deregulation, the weakening of the social safety net, free trade, privatization and tax cuts for the wealthy, they quickly gained political ascendancy, thanks to President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Neoliberalism has maintained the upper hand in policymaking ever since, contributing directly to the 2008 financial crisis through its disastrous undoing of post-Depression financial reforms and to the prevalence of budget-cutting austerity programs in the U.S. and Europe.
As neoliberalism gained ascendency, the center of gravity of mainstream, neoclassical economics moved to the right. Meanwhile, discrimination against Marxists and other critics has increased. We are ignored, ridiculed and told we’re not economists. There are very few job openings for us, mostly at liberal arts colleges rather than at universities with Ph.D. programs. This is the climate within which an interesting and sobering new form of McCarthyism occurred last spring. Six hundred liberal economists, including seven Nobel laureates, were red-baited by the Employment Policy Institute, a shady think tank funded by the restaurant industry, in a full-page New York Times advertisement because the letter they sent to President Barack Obama supporting increases in the minimum wage was also signed by eight radical/Marxist economists (including me).

New economics

But now, finally, economic change is afoot. With capitalism beset by multiple interconnected crises, the hegemony of neoliberalism appears to have peaked. The looming climate crisis and the power of the petroleum industry to corrupt governments and prevent a shift to a sustainable, carbon-free path reveal the oligarchic nature of unregulated free market capitalism. The intractable problem of poverty amid ill-gotten, empowered wealth, which sparked Occupy Wall Street, continues to draw attention, undermining neoclassical claims of the efficiency of labor markets. Last spring Pope Francis spoke forcefully for the “[rejection] of the absolute autonomy of markets and financial speculation” and for structural solutions to poverty and inequality. In January the Dalai Lama proclaimed that because of Marx’s focus on the alleviating the gap between the rich and the poor, “as far as social-economic theory is concerned, I am still a Marxist.” January also saw the widespread public outcry against the crippling austerity programs usher the leftist Syriza party, with Marxist Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, into power in Greece. The Spanish anti-austerity Podemos party looks as though it will follow in Syriza’s footsteps.
Change is also bubbling in the profession. One sign is the attention given to French economist Thomas Piketty’s best-seller “Capital in the 21st Century” at the American Economics Association meeting, including a webcast session in which Harvard conservative economist Greg Mankiw commented and Piketty responded. While Piketty is not a Marxist, he focuses on the unequal distribution of wealth (i.e., class) and chides mainstream economists for their “childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at the expense of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences,” as he puts it in his book. Another sign of change is that three of the 10 most influential economists, as ranked by The Economist, are vocal critics of neoclassical economics, neoliberal capitalism or both: Paul Krugman (No. 2), Thomas Piketty (No. 5) and Joseph Stiglitz (No. 9).
It is time for the economics profession in the U.S. to open itself to the new thinking that the current systemic economic crisis requires. We don’t need to start from scratch. There is a wealth of Marxist and heterodox ideas, Piketty’s among them, that can be drawn on to create healthy dialogue about the blind spots of neoclassical theory and about the failings of the capitalist system in its current form. Varoufakis has put forward a “radical pan-European green New Deal,” which includes “centralized funding for large-scale green energy research projects with decentralized assistance to small cooperatives that create local, sustainable development in cities and rural areas.” A growing body of solidarity economy research identifies, evaluates and advocates for existing economic practices and institutions animated by postcapitalist values — social responsibility, cooperation, equity in all dimensions, community and sustainability. Cooperatives of all types figure prominently as well as social entrepreneurship, the sharing economy, the commons and economic human rights.
The time for a new economics is at hand. The field must seek out and welcome a diversity of views and engender substantive debate about economic theory and the solutions to the crises we are facing. It’s not a moment too soon. 
Julie Matthaei is a professor of economics at Wellesley College and a co-founder of the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera America's editorial policy.

Friday, 22 August 2014

A Realistic Economics


The unrealistic orthodoxy: Neoclassical Economics

(Blogger Ref http://www.p2pfoundation.net/Transfinancial_Economics)




The economic and financial crisis has been caused by unenlightened self-interest and fraudulent behaviour on an unprecedented scale. But this behaviour could not have grown so large were it not for the cover given to this behaviour by the dominant theory of economics, which is known as "Neoclassical Economics".
Though many commentators call this theory "Keynesian", one of Keynes's objectives in the 1930s was to overthrow this theory. Instead, as the memory of the Great Depression receded, academic economists gradually constructed an even more extreme version. (This began with Hicks's "IS-LM" model, which is still accepted as representing "Keynesian" economics today. It was in fact a Neoclassical model derived two years before the General Theory was published.}
As it grew more virulent, Neoclassical theory encouraged politicians to remove the barriers to fraud that were erected in the wake of the last great economic crisis, the Great Depression, in the naïve belief that a deregulated economy necessarily reaches a harmonious equilibrium. As Robert Lucas, one of the chief theoriests of the Neoclassicals, put it:
'Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940's, as a part of the intellectual response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the body of knowledge and expertise that we hoped would prevent the recurrence of that economic disaster. My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades.'  (Lucas 2003 , p. 1 ; emphasis added)'
Regulators in its thrall—such as Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke—rescued the financial sector from a series of crises,  each one leading to another, until ultimately the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, from which no return to "business as usual" is possible. Neoclassical economics enabled and facilitated the collapse and continues to prolong the stagnation that has followed. It is time to succeed where Keynes failed, by eliminating this theory and replacing it with a realistic alternative.
Keynes was scathing about Neoclassical treatment of time, expectations, uncertainty and money, and the stability (or otherwise) of Capitalism:
I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future…. The orthodox theory assumes that we have a knowledge of the future of a kind quite different from that which we actually possess… The hypothesis of a calculable future leads to a wrong interpretation of the principles of behavior which the need for action compels us to adopt, and to an underestimation of the concealed factors of utter doubt, precariousness, hope and fear.  (Keynes 1937, pp. 215-222)
Keynes's failed in his attempt to overthrow Neoclassical economics. It was reconstructed in an even more extreme form in "Rational Expectations" macroeconomics (led by Robert Lucas). Far from simply dealing with the present "by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future", Rational Expectations deals with it by assuming we can accurately predict the future!
 
Prof. Keen wrote Debunking Economics to help prevent a Neoclassical revival after our current crisis is over, with the advantage of time over Keynes: when he wrote The General Theory  (1936). The flaws in Neoclassical economics were only vaguely specified—and Keynes himself retained some of the concepts (such as the marginal productivity theory of income distribution).
Since then, the flaws have been fully detailed, by critics like Pierro SraffaThe intent of Debunking Economics was to make the many flaws in Neoclassical economics so well known that it would not survive should the economy ever experience another Great Depression.
 (for more, see Debunking Economics: the naked emperor dethroned?;or buy the book: Amazon USAAmazon UKKindle USAKindle UKAbbey's Australia).
I also provide critiques of conventional economic theory in my lectures, which I make more broadly available via Youtube videos.

Developing an alternative

The seeds of an alternative, realistic theory were developed by Hyman Minsky in the Financial Instability Hypothesis, which itself reflected the wisdom of the great non-neoclassical economists Marx, Veblen, Schumpeter, Fisher and Keynes, as well as the historical record of capitalism that had included periodic Depressions (as well as the dramatic technological transformation of production). Minsky argued that an economic theory could not claim to represent capitalism unless it could explain those periodic crises:
Can "It"—a Great Depression—happen again? And if "It" can happen, why didn't "It" occur in the years since World War II? These are questions that naturally follow from both the historical record and the comparative success of the past thirty-five years. To answer these questions it is necessary to have an economic theory which makes great depressions one of the possible states in which our type of capitalist economy can find itself. (Minsky 1982, p. 5)
Minsky developed a coherent verbal model of his hypothesis, but his own attempt to develop a mathematical model in his PhD thesis was unsuccessful. Using insights from complexity theory, Prof. Keen developed models that captured the fundamental proposition of the Financial Instability Hypothesis--that a market economy can experience a debt-deflationafter a series of debt-financed cycles. These models generated a period of declining volatility in employment and wages with a rising ratio of debt to GDP, followed by rising volatility, and then a debt-induced breakdown.
From the perspective of economic theory and policy, this vision of a capitalist economy with finance requires us to go beyond that habit of mind which Keynes described so well, the excessive reliance on the (stable) recent past as a guide to the future. The chaotic dynamics explored in this paper should warn us against accepting a period of relative tranquility in a capitalist economy as anything other than a lull before the storm. (Keen, 1995)
The empirical data and the implications of these models led him to expect and warn of an impending serious economic crisis at a time when Neoclassical economists such as Ben Bernanke and Larry Summers were waxing lyrical about "The Great Moderation."
The cri­sis itself emphat­i­cally makes the point that a new the­ory of eco­nom­ics is needed, in which cap­i­tal­ism is seen as a dynamic, mon­e­tary sys­tem with both cre­ative and destruc­tive insta­bil­i­ties, where those destruc­tive insta­bil­i­ties emanate over­whelm­ingly from the finan­cial sector.


Source Ref Site
http://www.ideaeconomics.org/

Tuesday, 22 April 2014

How Not to Do Macroeconomics


A frustrating recurrence for critics of ‘mainstream’ economics is the assertion that they are criticising the economics of bygone days: that those phenomena which they assert economists do not consider are, in fact, at the forefront of economics research, and that the critics’ ignorance demonstrates that they are out of touch with modern economics – and therefore not fit to criticise it at all.
Nowhere is this more apparent than with macroeconomics. Macroeconomists are commonly accused of failing to incorporate dynamics in the financial sector such as debt, bubbles and even banks themselves, but while this was true pre-crisis, many contemporary macroeconomic models do attempt to include such things. Reputed economist Thomas Sargent charged that such criticisms “reflect either woeful ignorance or intentional disregard for what much of modern macroeconomics is about and what it has accomplished.” So what has it accomplished? One attempt to model the ongoing crisis using modern macro is this recent paper by Gauti Eggertsson & Neil Mehrotra, which tries to understand secular stagnation within a typical ‘overlapping generations’ framework. It’s quite a simple model, deliberately so, but it helps to illustrate the troubles faced by contemporary macroeconomics.
The model
The model has only 3 types of agents: young, middle-aged and old. The young borrow from the middle, who receive an income, some of which they save for old age. Predictably, the model employs all the standard techniques that heterodox economists love to hate, such as utility maximisation and perfect foresight. However, the interesting mechanics here are not in these; instead, what concerns me is the way ‘secular stagnation’ itself is introduced. In the model, the limit to how much young agents are allowed to borrow is exogenously imposed, and deleveraging/a financial crisis begins when this amount falls for unspecified reasons. In other words, in order to analyse deleveraging, Eggertson & Mehrotra simply assume that it happens, without asking why. As David Beckworth noted on twitter, this is simply assuming what you want to prove. (They go on to show similar effects can occur due to a fall in population growth or an increase in inequality, but again, these changes are modelled as exogenous).
It gets worse. Recall that the idea of secular stagnation is, at heart, a story about how over the last few decades we have not been able to create enough demand with ‘real’ investment, and have subsequently relied on speculative bubbles to push demand to an acceptable level. This was certainly the angle from which Larry Summers and subsequent commentators approached the issue. It’s therefore surprising – ridiculous, in fact – that this model of secular stagnation doesn’t include banks, and has only one financial instrument: a risk-less bond that agents use to transfer wealth between generations. What’s more, as the authors state, “no aggregate savings is possible (i.e. there is no capital)”. Yes, you read that right. How on earth can our model understand why there is not enough ‘traditional’ investment (i.e. capital formation), and why we need bubbles to fill that gap, if we can have neither investment nor bubbles?
Naturally, none of these shortcomings stop Eggertson & Mehrotra from proceeding, and ending the paper in economists’ favourite way…policy prescriptions! Yes, despite the fact that this model is not only unrealistic but quite clearly unfit for purpose on its own terms, and despite the fact that it has yielded no falsifiable predictions (?), the authors go on give policy advice about redistribution, monetary and fiscal policy. Considering this paper is incomprehensible to most of the public, one is forced to wonder to whom this policy advice is accountable. Note that I am not implying policymakers are puppets on the strings of macroeconomists, but things like this definitely contribute to debate – after all, secular stagnation was referenced by the Chancellor in UK parliament (though admittedly he did reject it). Furthermore, when you have economists with a platform like Paul Krugman endorsing the model, it’s hard to argue that it couldn’t have at least some degree of influence on policy-makers.
Now, I don’t want to make general comments solely on the basis of this paper: after all, the authors themselves admit it is only a starting point. However, some of the problems I’ve highlighted here are not uncommon in macro: a small number of agents on whom some rather arbitrary assumptions are imposed to create loosely realistic mechanics, an unexplained ‘shock’ used to create a crisis. This is true of the earlier, similar paper by Eggertson & Krugman, which tries to model debt-deflation using two types of agents: ‘patient’ agents, who save, and ‘impatient agents’, who borrow. Once more, deleveraging begins when the exogenously imposed constraint on the patient agent’s borrowing falls For Some Reason, and differences in the agents’ respective consumption levels reduce aggregate demand as the debt is paid back. Again, there are no banks, no investment and no real financial sector. Similarly, even the far more sophisticated Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov - which actually includes investment and a financial sector – still only has two agents, and relies on exogenous shocks to drive the economy away from its steady-state.
Whither macroeconomics?
Why do so many models seem to share these characteristics? Well, perhaps thanks to the Lucas Critique, macroeconomic models must be built up from optimising agents. Since modelling human behaviour is inconceivably complex, mathematical tractability forces economists to make important parameters exogenous, and to limit the number (or number of types) of agents in the model, as well as these agents’ goals & motivations. Complicated utility functions which allow for fairly common properties like relative status effects, or different levels of risk aversion at different incomes, may be possible to explore in isolation, but they’re not generalisable to every case or the models become impossible to solve/indeterminate. The result is that a model which tries to explore something like secular stagnation can end up being highly stylised, to the point of missing the most important mechanics altogether. It will also be unable to incorporate other well-known developments from elsewhere in the field.
This is why I’d prefer something like Stock-Flow Consistent models, which focus on accounting relations and flows of funds, to be the norm in macroeconomics. As economists know all too well, all models abstract from some things, and when we are talking about big, systemic problems, it’s not particularly important whether Maria’s level of consumption is satisfying a utility function. What’s important is how money and resources move around: where they come from, and how they are split – on aggregate – between investment, consumption, financial speculation and so forth. This type of methodology can help understand how the financial sector might create bubbles; or why deficits grow and shrink; or how government expenditure impacts investment. What’s more, it will help us understand all of these aspects of the economy at the same time. We will not have an overwhelming number of models, each highlighting one particular mechanic, with no ex ante way of selecting between them, but one or a small number of generalisable models which can account for a large number of important phenomena.
Finally, to return to the opening paragraph, this paper may help to illustrate a lesson for both economists and their critics. The problem is not that economists are not aware of or never try to model issue x, y or z. Instead, it’s that when they do consider x, y or z, they do so in an inappropriate way, shoehorning problems into a reductionist, marginalist framework, and likely making some of the most important working parts exogenous. For example, while critics might charge that economists ignore mark-up pricing, the real problem is that when economists do include mark-up pricing, the mark-up is over marginal rather than average cost, which is not what firms actually do. While critics might charge that economists pay insufficient attention to institutions, a more accurate critique is that when economists include institutions, they are generally considered as exogenous costs or constraints, without any two-way interaction between agents and institutions. While it’s unfair to say economists have not done work that relaxes rational expectations, the way they do so still leaves agents pretty damn rational by most peoples’ standards. And so on.
However, the specific examples are not important. It seems increasingly clear that economists’ methodology, while it is at least superficially capable of including everything from behavioural economics to culture to finance, severely limits their ability to engage with certain types of questions. If you want to understand the impact of a small labour market reform, or how auctions work, or design a new market, existing economic theory (and econometrics) is the place to go. On the other hand, if you want to understand development, historical analysis has a lot more to offer than abstract theory. If you want to understand how firms work, you’re better off with survey evidence and case studies (in fairness, economists themselves have been moving some way in this direction with Industrial Organisation, although if you ask me oligopoly theory has many of the same problems as macro) than marginalism. And if you want to understand macroeconomics and finance, you have to abandon the obsession with individual agents and zoom out to look at the bigger picture. Otherwise you’ll just end up with an extremely narrow model that proves little except its own existence.

Friday, 30 November 2012

Institutional Economics

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Institutional economics focuses on understanding the role of the evolutionary process and the role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour. Its original focus lay in Thorstein Veblen's instinct-oriented dichotomy between technology on the one side and the "ceremonial" sphere of society on the other. Its name and core elements trace back to a 1919 American Economic Review article by Walton H. Hamilton.[1][2] Institutional economics emphasizes a broader study of institutions and views markets as a result of the complex interaction of these various institutions (e.g. individuals, firms, states, social norms). The earlier tradition continues today as a leading heterodox approach to economics.[3]
A significant variant is the new institutional economics from the later 20th century, which integrates later developments of neoclassical economics into the analysis. Law and economics has been a major theme since the publication of the Legal Foundations of Capitalism by John R. Commons in 1924. Behavioral economics is another hallmark of institutional economics based on what is known about psychology and cognitive science, rather than simple assumptions of economic behavior.

Contents

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[edit] Institutional economics

Institutional economics focuses on learning, bounded rationality, and evolution (rather than assume stable preferences, rationality and equilibrium). It was a central part of American economics in the first part of the 20th century, including such famous but diverse economists as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, and John R. Commons.[4] Some institutionalists see Karl Marx as belonging to the institutionalist tradition, because he described capitalism as a historically-bounded social system; other institutionalist economists disagree with Marx's definition of capitalism, instead seeing defining features such as markets, money and the private ownership of production as indeed evolving over time, but as a result of the purposive actions of individuals.
"Traditional" institutionalism [1] rejects the reduction of institutions to simply tastes, technology, and nature (see naturalistic fallacy). Tastes, along with expectations of the future, habits, and motivations, not only determine the nature of institutions but are limited and shaped by them. If people live and work in institutions on a regular basis, it shapes their world-views. Fundamentally, this traditional institutionalism (and its modern counter-part institutionalist political economy) emphasizes the legal foundations of an economy (see John R. Commons) and the evolutionary, habituated, and volitional processes by which institutions are erected and then changed (see John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, and Daniel Bromley.) The vacillations of institutions are necessarily a result of the very incentives created by such institutions, and are thus endogenous. Emphatically, traditional institutionalism is in many ways a response to the current economic orthodoxy; its reintroduction in the form of institutionalist political economy is thus an explicit challenge to neoclassical economics, since it is based on the fundamental premise that neoclassicists oppose: that economics cannot be separated from the political and social system within which it is embedded. Some of the authors associated with this school include Robert H. Frank, Warren Samuels, Mark Tool, Geoffrey Hodgson, Daniel Bromley, Jonathan Nitzan, Shimshon Bichler, Elinor Ostrom, Anne Mayhew, John Kenneth Galbraith and Gunnar Myrdal, but even the sociologist C. Wright Mills was highly influenced by the institutionalist approach in his major studies.

[edit] Thorstein Veblen


Thorstein Veblen came from rural Mid-western America and Norwegian immigrant family
Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) wrote his first and most influential book while he was at the University of Chicago, on The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899).[5] In it he analyzed the motivation in capitalism to conspicuously consume their riches as a way of demonstrating success. Conspicuous leisure was another focus of Veblen's critique. The concept of conspicuous consumption was in direct contradiction to the neoclassical view that capitalism was efficient. In The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) Veblen distinguished the motivations of industrial production for people to use things from business motivations that used, or misused, industrial infrastructure for profit, arguing that the former is often hindered because businesses pursue the latter. Output and technological advance are restricted by business practices and the creation of monopolies. Businesses protect their existing capital investments and employ excessive credit, leading to depressions and increasing military expenditure and war through business control of political power. These two books, focusing on criticism first of consumerism, and second of profiteering, did not advocate change.
Through the 1920s and after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 Thorstein Veblen's warnings of the tendency for wasteful consumption and the necessity of creating sound financial institutions seemed to ring true. Veblen remains a leading critic, which cautions against the excesses of "the American way".
Thorstein Veblen wrote in 1898 an article entitled "Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science"[6] and he became the precursor of current evolutionary economics.

[edit] John R. Commons

John R. Commons (1862–1945) also came from mid-Western America. Underlying his ideas, consolidated in Institutional Economics (1934) was the concept that the economy is a web of relationships between people with diverging interests. There are monopolies, large corporations, labour disputes and fluctuating business cycles. They do however have an interest in resolving these disputes. Government, thought Commons, ought to be the mediator between the conflicting groups. Commons himself devoted much of his time to advisory and mediation work on government boards and industrial commissions.

[edit] Wesley Mitchell

Wesley Clair Mitchell (August 5, 1874 – October 29, 1948) was an American economist known for his empirical work on business cycles and for guiding the National Bureau of Economic Research in its first decades. Mitchell’s teachers included economists Thorstein Veblen and J. L. Laughlin and philosopher John Dewey.

[edit] Clarence Ayres

Clarence Ayres (May 6, 1891 – July 24, 1972) was the principal thinker of what some has called the Texas school of institutional economics. Ayres developed on the ideas of Thorstein Veblen with a dichotomy of "technology" and "institutions" to separate the inventive from the inherited aspects of economic structures. He claimed that technology was always one step ahead of the socio-cultural institutions. Indeed, it can be argued that Ayres was not an "institutionalist" in any normal sense of the term; since he identified institutions with sentiments and superstition and in consequence institutions only played a kind of residual role in this theory of development which core center was that of technology. Indeed, Ayres was under strong influence of Hegel and institutions for Ayres had the same function as "Schein" (with the connotation of deception, and illusion) for Hegel. A more appropriate name for Ayres' position would be that of a "techno-behaviorist" rather than an institutionalist.

[edit] Adolf Berle


Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr.
Adolf A. Berle (1895–1971) was one of the first authors to combine legal and economic analysis, and his work stands as a founding pillar of thought in modern corporate governance. Like Keynes, Berle was at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, but subsequently resigned from his diplomatic job dissatisfied with the Versailles Treaty terms. In his book with Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), he detailed the evolution in the contemporary economy of big business, and argued that those who controlled big firms should be better held to account. Directors of companies are held to account to the shareholders of companies, or not, by the rules found in company law statutes. This might include rights to elect and fire the management, require for regular general meetings, accounting standards, and so on. In 1930s America, the typical company laws (e.g. in Delaware) did not clearly mandate such rights. Berle argued that the unaccountable directors of companies were therefore apt to funnel the fruits of enterprise profits into their own pockets, as well as manage in their own interests. The ability to do this was supported by the fact that the majority of shareholders in big public companies were single individuals, with scant means of communication, in short, divided and conquered. Berle served in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration through the depression, and was a key member of the so called "Brain trust" developing many of the New Deal policies. In 1967, Berle and Means issued a revised edition of their work, in which the preface added a new dimension. It was not only the separation of controllers of companies from the owners as shareholders at stake. They posed the question of what the corporate structure was really meant to achieve.
“Stockholders toil not, neither do they spin, to earn [dividends and share price increases]. They are beneficiaries by position only. Justification for their inheritance... can be founded only upon social grounds... that justification turns on the distribution as well as the existence of wealth. Its force exists only in direct ratio to the number of individuals who hold such wealth. Justification for the stockholder's existence thus depends on increasing distribution within the American population. Ideally the stockholder's position will be impregnable only when every American family has its fragment of that position and of the wealth by which the opportunity to develop individuality becomes fully actualized.”[7]

[edit] John Kenneth Galbraith

John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006) worked in the New Deal administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Although he wrote later, and was more developed than the earlier institutional economists, Galbraith was critical of orthodox economics throughout the late twentieth century. In The Affluent Society (1958), Galbraith argues voters reaching a certain material wealth begin to vote against the common good. He coins the term "conventional wisdom" to refer to the orthodox ideas that underpin the resulting conservative consensus.[8]
In an age of big business, it is unrealistic to think only of markets of the classical kind. Big businesses set their own terms in the marketplace, and use their combined resources for advertising programmes to support demand for their own products. As a result, individual preferences actually reflect the preferences of entrenched corporations, a "dependence effect", and the economy as a whole is geared to irrational goals.[9] In The New Industrial State Galbraith argues that economic decisions are planned by a private bureaucracy, a technostructure of experts who manipulate is marketing and public relations channels. This hierarchy is self-serving, profits are no longer the prime motivator, and even managers are not in control. Because they are the new planners, corporations detest risk, requiring steady economic and stable markets. They recruit governments to serve their interests with fiscal and monetary policy. While the goals of an affluent society and complicit government serve the irrational technostructure, public space is simultaneously impoverished. Galbraith paints the picture of stepping from penthouse villas on to unpaved streets, from landscaped gardens to unkempt public parks. In Economics and the Public Purpose (1973) Galbraith advocates a "new socialism" (social democracy) as the solution, with nationalization of military production and public services such as health care, plus disciplined salary and price controls to reduce inequality.

[edit] New institutional economics

With the new developments in the economic theory of organizations, information, property rights,[10] and transaction costs,[11] an attempt was made to integrate institutionalism into more recent developments in mainstream economics, under the title new institutional economics.[12][13].

[edit] Institutionalism today

The earlier approach was a central element in American economics in the interwar years after 1919 but was marginalized to a relatively minor role as to mainstream economics in the postwar period with the ascendence of neoclassical and Keynesian approaches. It continued, however, as a leading heterodox approach in critiquing neoclassical economics and as an alternative research program in economics.[citation needed] The leading Swedish economist Lars Pålsson Syll is a believer in institutional economics.[14] He is an outspoken opponent to all kinds of social constructivism and postmodern relativism.[15]

[edit] Criticism

Critics of institutionalism have maintained that the concept of "institution" is so central for all social science that it is senseless to use it as a buzzword for a particular theoretical school. And as a consequence the elusive meaning of the concept of "institution" has resulted in a bewildering and never-ending dispute about which scholars are "institutionalists" or not—and a similar confusion about what is supposed to be the core of the theory. In other words, institutional economics have become so popular because it means all things to all people, which in the end of the day is the meaning of nothing. Indeed, it can be argued that the term "institutionalists" was misplaced from the very beginning, since Veblen, Hamilton and Ayres were preoccupied with the evolutionary (and "objectifying") forces of technology and institutions had a secondary place within their theories. Institutions were almost a kind of "anti-stuff," their key concern was on technology and not on institutions. Rather than being "institutional," Veblen, Hamilton and Ayres position is anti-institutional.[16]

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Walton H. Hamilton (1919). "The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory," American Economic Review, 9(1), Supplement,, p p. 309-318. Reprinted in R. Albelda, C. Gunn, and W. Waller (1987), Alternatives to Economic Orthodoxy: A Reader in Political Economy, pp. 204- 12.
  2. ^ D.R. Scott, Veblen not an Institutional Economist. The American Economic Review. Vol.23. No.2. June 1933. pp.274-277.
  3. ^ Warren J. Samuels ([1987] 2008). "institutional economics," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Abstract.
  4. ^ Malcolm Rutherford (2008). "institutionalism, old," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 4, pp. 374-81. Abstract.
  5. ^ Heilbroner, Robert (2000) [1953]. The Worldly Philosophers (seventh ed.). London: Penguin Books. pp. 221, 228–33, 244. ISBN 978-0-140-29006-6.
  6. ^ Veblen, Th. 1898 "Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12.
  7. ^ Berle (1967) p. xxiii
  8. ^ Galbraith (1958) Chapter 2 (Although Galbraith claimed to coin the phrase 'conventional wisdom,' the phrase is used several times in a book by Thorstein Veblen that Galbraith might have read, The Instinct of Workmanship.)
  9. ^ Galbraith (1958) Chapter 11
  10. ^ Dean Lueck (2008). "property law, economics and," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
  11. ^ M. Klaes (2008). "transaction costs, history of," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
  12. ^ Ronald Coase (1998). "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, 88(2), pp. 72-74].
    • _____ (1991). "The Institutional Structure of Production," Nobel Prize Lecture PDF, reprinted in 1992, American Economic Review, 82(4), pp. 713-719.
    Douglass C. North (1995). "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development," in The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, J. Harriss, J. Hunter, and C. M. Lewis, ed., pp. 17-26.
    Elinor Ostrom (2005). "Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies," Handbook of New Institutional Economics, C. Ménard and M. Shirley, eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics, pp. 819-848. Springer.
    Oliver E. Williamson (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), pp. 595-613 (press +).
  13. ^ Mohammad Amin & Jamal Haidar, 2012. "The cost of registering property: does legal origin matter?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 1035-1050, June
  14. ^ Gudeman, Stephen (2005). Peopled Economies: Conversations With Stephen Gudeman. Staffan Löfving. ISBN 91-974705-6-2. http://books.google.ca/books?id=kbYVamkNGkAC&pg=PA2.
  15. ^ "LARS PÅLSSON SYLL". Arenagruppen. http://www.bokforlagetatlas.se/author/lars-palsson-syll/. Retrieved 2012-04-17.
  16. ^ David Hamilton, "Why is Institutional economics not institutional?" The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol.21. no.3. July 1962. pp.309-317.

[edit] References

  • Bromley, Daniel (2006). Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions, Princeton University Press.
  • Chang, Ha-Joon (2002). Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State, Zed Books.
  • Cheung, Steven N. S. (1970). "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, 13(1), pp. 49-70.
  • Commons, John R. (1931). "Institutional Economics," American Economic Review Vol. 21 : p p.648–657.
  • _____ (1931). "Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec.), Vol. 26, No. 1, (1936): p p. 237-249.
  • _____ (1934 [1986]). Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy, Macmillan. Description and preview.
  • Davis, John B. (2007). "The Nature of Heterodox Economics," Post-autistic Economics Review, issue no. 40.[2]
  • _____, “Why Is Economics Not Yet a Pluralistic Science?”, Post-autistic Economics Review, issue no. 43, 15 September, pp. 43–51.
  • Easterly, William (2001). "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 49, No. 4), pp. 687-706.
  • Fiorito, Luca and Massimiliano Vatiero, (2011). "Beyond Legal Relations: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's Influence on American Institutionalism". Journal of Economics Issues, 45 (1): 199-222.
  • Galbraith, John Kenneth, (1973). "Power & the Useful Economist," American Economic Review 63:1-11.
  • Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1998). "The Approach of Institutional Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), pp. 166-192 (close Bookmarks).
  • _____, ed. (2003). Recent Developments in Institutional Economics, Elgar. Description and contents.
  • _____ (2004). The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism, London and New York: Routledge.
  • Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen, "Darwin's Conjecture" The Montreal Review (August, 2011).
  • Hodgson, Samuels, & Tool (1994). The Elgar Companion to Institutional & Evolutionary Economics, Edward Elgar.
  • Keaney, Michael, (2002). "Critical Institutionalism: From American Exceptionalism to International Relevance", in Understanding Capitalism: Critical Analysis From Karl Marx to Amartya Sen, ed. Doug Dowd, Pluto Press.
  • Nicita, A., and M. Vatiero (2007). “The Contract and the Market: Towards a Broader Notion of Transaction?”. Studi e Note di Economia, 1:7-22.
  • North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press.
  • Elinor Ostrom (2005). "Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies," Handbook of New Institutional Economics, C. Ménard and M. Shirley, eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics, pp. 819-848. Springer.
  • Rutherford, Malcolm (2001). "Institutional Economics: Then and Now," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer), p. 173-194.
  • Li, Rita Yi Man (2011). "Everyday Life Application of Neo-institutional Economics: A Global Perspective", Germany, Lambert.
  • Schmid, A. Allan (2004). Conflict & Cooperation: Institutional & Behavioral Economics, Blackwell.
  • Samuels, Warren J. (2007), The Legal-Economic Nexus, Routledge.
  • From The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008):
Polterovich, Victor. "institutional traps." Abstract.
Rutherford, Malcolm. "institutionalism, old." Abstract.
Samuels, Warren J. [1987]. "institutional economics." Abstract.

[edit] Journals

[edit] External links